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The Paradoxes of Defensive 
Medicine 
Michael J. Saks and Stephan Landsman† 
Abstract 
For decades, “defensive medicine” has been the leading 
argument driving reforms of medical malpractice laws throughout 
the United States. Defensive medicine is the presumed practice of 
administering excessive tests and treatments as a stratagem for 
reducing healthcare providers’ risk of malpractice liability, 
despite the absence of any expected benefit for the patient. The 
practice is widely believed to exist throughout American 
healthcare as a response to fears of malpractice litigation, and 
thought to be enormously wasteful of healthcare dollars. In 
consequence, it has become a justification for law reforms 
insulating the healthcare industry from tort liability. These 
claims are promoted by the healthcare industry even though they 
imply that most providers routinely engage in healthcare fraud 
and violate their own ethical rules. We review the evidence behind 
these beliefs—including direct physician surveys, clinical scenario 
studies, and multivariate analyses of actual case data—and find 
little support and numerous paradoxes. The validity vel non of 
the defensive medicine narrative has implications for law and 
legal policy, as well as healthcare economics and patient safety. 
Contents 
Abstract .............................................................................. 25 
Contents .............................................................................. 25 
Introduction ....................................................................... 26 
I. A Contrivance for Advocacy? ................................. 27 
A. Healthcare Expenditures and Revenues ..................... 27 
B. Iatrogenic Injuries and Deaths ................................... 29 
C. Making an Excellent Situation Better ........................ 34 
II. Why Commit and Why Admit? ................................. 37 
 
†  Michal J. Saks is Regents Professor, Sandra Day O’Connor College 
of Law, Arizona State University. Stephan Landsman is the Robert 
A. Clifford Professor Emeritus, College of Law, DePaul University. 
The authors thank Sarah Pook for her research assistance. 
Health Matrix·Volume 30·2020 
The Paradoxes of Defensive Medicine 
26 
A. Why Engage in Defensive Medicine? ........................ 37 
B. When is Defensive Medicine Actually Defensive? ..... 41 
C. Why Would Anyone Admit to Engaging in Defensive 
Medicine? ................................................................. 44 
III. Does Defensive Medicine Actually Occur? ....... 49 
A. Direct Physician Surveys ........................................... 53 
B. Clinical Scenario Surveys .......................................... 59 
C. Multivariate Statistical Analyses ............................... 62 
1. Studies and Their Findings: Cesarean Sections ... 65 
2. Studies and Their Findings: Cardiac and Other 
Medical Procedures ............................................. 66 
3. One “Almost Quasi-Experiment” ......................... 73 
Discussion ............................................................................. 75 
 
Introduction 
Risks of harm to patients present a broad array of problems 
and possible solutions to the existing law and current healthcare 
system.1 Aside from medical malpractice litigation itself, perhaps 
nothing is as controversial as “defensive medicine.” Defensive 
medicine is almost universally regarded as a dreadful problem: a 
bane of the healthcare system, an evil committed by healthcare 
providers, suffered by patients, paid for by all of society, and 
blamed on the tort system.2 Its causes and consequences, as well 
as its existence, are widely accepted with little question.3 
In general terms, defensive medicine can be thought of as the 
practice of ordering medically unnecessary tests and performing 
needless procedures for purposes unrelated to the well-being of 
patients. Rather, it is “employed explicitly for the purposes either 
of averting a possible lawsuit or [if a lawsuit were filed] of 
providing appropriate documentation that a wide range of tests 
 
1. See, generally, MICHAEL J. SAKS AND STEPHAN LANDSMAN, CLOSING 
DEATH’S DOOR: LEGAL INNOVATIONS TO STEM THE EPIDEMIC OF 
HEALTHCARE HARM (forthcoming). 
2. See, e.g., M. Sonal Sekhar & N. Vyas, Defensive Medicine: A Bane 
to Healthcare, 3 ANNALS MED. HEALTH SCI. RES. 295, 296 (2013). 
3. See e.g., Laura D. Hermer and Howard Brody, Defensive Medicine, 
Cost Containment, and Reform, 25 J. OF GEN. INTERNAL MED. 470, 
470 (2010). 
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and treatments has been used in the patient’s care.”4 One needn’t 
be a medical expert to recognize this as a “deviation from sound 
medical practice.”5 
A generation ago, during a panel discussion about “public 
discontent” with tort law, one participant asked, “[W]hat about 
the problem of defensive medicine? The general counsel of a New 
York hospital told me that from 15 percent to 25 percent of their 
services are done solely to provide a possible defense in a 
lawsuit.”6 In response, another panelist posed the naked emperor 
question: “I would like to know where can we go for 
documentation of defensive medicine? Where are the independent 
studies that show us what defensive medicine really is—beyond a 
catch phrase, what it means in reality, and how we can evaluate 
it? Where can we go beyond the assertions of interested parties?”7 
Indeed. How do we actually know anything about it? How 
was the phenomenon of defensive medicine discovered? By whom? 
What is the evidence for it, for its costs, that it even exists? Do 
we have answers yet? How do we know that defensive medicine 
is an economic and behavioral discovery, rather than a rhetorical 
discovery? 
I. A Contrivance for Advocacy? 
A. Healthcare Expenditures and Revenues 
That “defensive medicine” is a useful trope for healthcare 
industry lobbyists can be readily understood. Beyond this, as will 
be demonstrated, little else about defensive medicine is clear. The 
 
4. Laurence R. Tancredi & Jeremiah A. Barondess, The Problem of 
Defensive Medicine, 200 SCI. 879, 879 (1978); Medicine, STEDMAN’S 
MEDICAL DICTIONARY (28th ed. 2005) (“[D]iagnostic or therapeutic 
measures conducted primarily as a safeguard against possible 
malpractice liability”); Frank A. Sloan & John H. Shadle, Is There 
Empirical Evidence for “Defensive Medicine”? A Reassessment, 28 
J. HEALTH ECON. 481 (2009) (describing defensive medicine as care 
for which expected cost exceeds expected benefit). 
5. David M. Studdert et al., Defensive Medicine Among High-Risk 
Specialist Physicians in a Volatile Malpractice Environment, 293 
JAMA 2609, 2609 (2005). 
6. Richard Abel et al., Public Discontent: The Debate Goes Beyond 
Tort Law; It’s About Lawyers, 81 ABA J. 70, 72 (1995) (quoting 
Philip Howard). 
7. Id. (quoting Stephen Daniels). 
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lobbyist’s goal is to bring about changes in law that advantage 
the client industry by increasing its revenues or reducing its costs. 
From that perspective, the chief problem with the medical-
malpractice system is that its direct economic cost is relatively 
small. The total amount of malpractice insurance premiums 
collected (from doctors, hospitals, and other providers) reflects 
most of the costs required for the defense of any and all claims: 
compensation payments, legal fees, profits for insurance 
companies, administrative costs, and anything else.8 That total 
represents one quarter of one percent of all expenditures on 
healthcare; that is, $9.2 billion out of $3.5 trillion.9 Placed in the 
context of liability insurance for all U.S. industries, that $9.2 
billion constitutes only 2.4% of all the liability insurance 
premiums paid for all activities in the U.S.10 At the same time, 
the healthcare industry collects 17.9% of our nation’s GDP while 
causing more serious accidental injuries and deaths than all other 
human activity combined.11 
 
8. We say “most of the costs” because some very large healthcare 
organizations, and some government facilities, self-insure; thus, 
their liability expenditures are not reflected in the insurance data 
we cite. See Understanding Medical Malpractice Insurance, INS. 
INFO. INST., https://www.iii.org/article/understanding-medical-
malpractice-insurance [https://perma.cc/PY22-ZRF2] (last visited 
Nov. 6, 2019) (“Medical professionals employed by federal agencies, 
such as the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, do not need 
malpractice coverage since the federal government self-insures 
against liability claims. State and local governments in some 
instances may also provide liability protection for medical 
employees.”). 
9. Data from 2017; malpractice premiums from Best’s Rankings U.S. 
Property/Casualty – 2018 Direct Premiums Written by Line, A.M. 
BEST (June 18, 2019), http://www.ambest.com/review/display
chart.aspx?Record_Code=274410 [https://perma.cc/H2Q9-24RS] 
[hereinafter Best’s Rankings]; healthcare expenditures from NHE 
Fact Sheet, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://
www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-and-systems/statistics-
trends-and-reports/nationalhealthexpenddata/nhe-fact-sheet.html 
[https://perma.cc/3APU-HURR] (last updated Apr. 26, 2019). 
10. Best’s Rankings, supra note 9. 
11. LINDA T. KOHN ET AL., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER 
HEALTH SYSTEM 26 (2000). The 17.9% figure comes from NHE Fact 
Sheet, supra note 9. All else being equal, one might expect an 
industry that constitutes 17.9% of the economic activity of society 
to cause approximately 17.9% of the damage and pay 
approximately 17.9% of the cost of those damages (by way of its 
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Regarding cost, the U.S. healthcare industry charges more 
(while delivering poorer outcomes) than its counterparts in other 
modern nations.12 For example, “spending began soaring [after 
1980] beyond that of other advanced nations, but without the 
same benefits in life expectancy.”13 Americans now pay thousands 
for the same services that cost hundreds to citizens of other 
advanced societies. We spend more than twice as much per capita 
than the average of all other modern nations, while our “health 
system generally delivers worse health outcomes than any other 
developed country.”14 According to Elisabeth Rosenthal, formerly 
an emergency physician and currently editor-in-chief of Kaiser 
Health News, “[i]n the past quarter century, the American 
medical system has stopped focusing on health or even science. 
Instead it attends more or less single-mindedly to its own 
profits.”15 Reforms prompted by notions of defensive medicine are 
part of that effort. 
B. Iatrogenic Injuries and Deaths 
Despite the enormous expenditures Americans make for 
healthcare, preventable medical error and injury have emerged as 
extremely serious problems in the United States. Though the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) does not make 
 
liability insurance). Yet, according to the numbers, the healthcare 
industry generates far more than its share of the damage—while 
paying only a bit more than a tenth of its “share” of victim 
reimbursement costs for those harms. 
12. See, e.g., ELIZABETH DOCTEUR & ROBERT A, BERENSON, HOW DOES 
THE QUALITY OF U.S. HEALTH CARE COMPARE INTERNATIONALLY? 
TIMELY ANALYSIS OF IMMEDIATE HEALTH POLICY ISSUES 10 (2009); 
Irene Papanicolas et al., Health Care Spending in the United States 
and Other High-Income Countries, 319 JAMA 1024, 1025 (2018); 
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL & INST. OF MED., U.S. HEALTH IN INT’L 
PERSPECTIVE: SHORTER LIVES, POORER HEALTH 91 (Steven H. 
Woolf & Laudan Aron eds., 2013). 
13. Austin Frakt, Medical Mystery: Something Happened to U.S. 
Health Spending After 1980, N. Y. TIMES (May 14, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/14/upshot/medical-mystery-
health-spending-1980.html [https://perma.cc/VBM7-EEVY]. 
14. ELISABETH ROSENTHAL, AN AMERICAN SICKNESS 3 (2017). 
15. Id. at 1. 
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a point of separately counting deaths due to iatrogenic injuries16 
in its monitoring of the “leading causes of death in the United 
States,” if it did, annual deaths due to medical error by itself, 
separate from other causes of accidental death, would rank third 
after heart disease and cancer.17 Makary and Daniel, combining 
major studies of several types,18 calculated “a mean rate of death 
from medical error of 251,454 a year.”19 The patient chart reviews 
employed in those studies resemble a net with holes large enough 
for many actual instances of adverse events20 to slip through. 
Studies using more intensive approaches found that the number 
of serious injuries and deaths were fifteen-to-twenty times as great 
as found using only chart reviews.21 Another technique, the Global 
Trigger, found as many as ten times the number of adverse 
events, and more than twice as many deaths, as the earlier records 
reviews.22 Upon reviewing the four major Global Trigger studies 
available, James concluded in 2013 that deaths from “preventable 
 
16. STEVEN PEGALIS, AMERICAN LAW MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 130 (3rd 
ed. 2019) (“An iatrogenic injury is an injury produced in response 
to the physician/health care provider’s therapeutic effort.”). 
17. See Martin Makary & Michael Daniel, Medical Error—The Third 
Leading Cause of Death in the U.S., BMJ (May 2016). 
18. See, e.g., KOHN ET AL., supra note 11, at 1. 
19. Makary & Daniel, supra note 17. 
20. “Adverse event” is the prevailing term of art in patient-safety 
research. An adverse event is defined as “an injury that was caused 
by medical management (rather than the underlying disease) and 
that prolonged the hospitalization, produced a disability at the 
time of discharge, or both.” Troyen A. Brennan et al., Adverse 
Events and Negligence in Hospitalized Patients, 324 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 370, 370 (1991). 
21. See, e.g., Lori B. Andrews et al., An Alternative Strategy for 
Studying Adverse Events in Medical Care, 349 LANCET 309, 312-13 
(1997); Lori Andrews, Studying Medical Error in Situ: Implications 
for Malpractice Law and Policy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 357, 357, 361-
62 (2004); Knight Steel et al., Iatrogenic Illness on a General 
Medical Service at a University Hospital, 304 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
638 (1981). 
22. See David C. Classen et al., ‘Global Trigger Tool’ Shows that 
Adverse Events in Hospitals May Be Ten Times Greater than 
Previously Measured, 30 HEALTH AFF. 581, 584 (2011). 
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adverse events” numbered somewhere between 210,000 and 
440,000 per year.23 
All of the above studies and reviews are limited to what 
happens to inpatients in non-federal, acute-care hospitals. Beyond 
those patients were others receiving diagnoses, treatments, and 
surgery in various other hospital and non-hospital settings, such 
as doctors’ offices, outpatient clinics, free-standing-surgical 
centers, skilled-nursing facilities, rehabilitation hospitals, and 
nursing homes. Regarding what happens in those settings, the 
research is far more limited. But a few facts provide clues. First, 
surgical visits occur as frequently—or perhaps more frequently—
in outpatient settings as in hospitals.24 Though surgeries in 
hospitals would, in the aggregate, involve more serious and risky 
conditions, the sheer number of surgeries that take place outside 
of hospitals25 offers ample opportunity for preventable errors to 
occur. Second, approximately 1.8% of patients in skilled-nursing 
facilities died as a result of the care that they received, or needed 
but did not receive, in such facilities.26 This would add 
approximately 90,000 deaths to the total.27 Third, an IOM study 
of medication-related injuries concluded that three times as many 
harmful medication errors occur in healthcare delivered outside 
 
23. John T. James, A New, Evidence-based Estimate of Patient Harms 
Associated with Hospital Care, 9 J. PATIENT SAFETY 122, 127 
(2013). 
24. Karen A. Cullen et al., Ambulatory Surgery in the United States, 
2006, NAT’L HEALTH STATS. REP. NO. 11, at 5 (Sept. 4, 2009), 
available at https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr011.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2WPZ-B67Q]; See also, Judy Mathias, AHRQ 
Releases Stats on Outpatient, Inpatient Surgeries, OR MANAGER 
(June 2, 2017), https://www.ormanager.com/briefs/ahrq-releases-
stats-on-outpatient-inpatient-surgeries/ [https://perma.cc/GB3Z-
H9QQ]. 
25. NAT’L QUALITY FORUM, FINAL REPORT: NQF-ENDORSED MEASURES 
FOR SURGICAL PROCEDURES, 2015–2017, at 5 (2017) (“In 2006, an 
estimated 53.3 million surgical and nonsurgical procedures were 
performed in U.S. ambulatory surgery centers, both hospital-based 
and freestanding. In 2010, 51.4 million inpatient procedures were 
performed in nonfederal hospitals in the United States.”). 
26. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., OEI-06-11-00370, ADVERSE EVENTS IN 
SKILLED NURSING FACILITIES: NATIONAL INCIDENCE AMONG 
MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES, at 19 (2014). 
27. Id. 
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of hospitals as inside them.28 Fourth, nearly as many payments 
to compensate patients for iatrogenic harms were made for 
injuries that incurred in outpatient settings as in hospitals, two-
thirds of which were for major injury or death.29 The leading type 
of error in the outpatient setting is diagnostic.30 Medication errors 
in the outpatient setting accounted for 1 out of 131 deaths 
compared to only 1 out of 854 inpatient deaths.31 In light of these 
facts, however incomplete, a conservative estimate would be that 
as many preventable deaths and serious injuries occur in 
healthcare settings outside of hospitals as occur inside of 
hospitals.32 
Finally, there is the problem of unnecessary care—subjecting 
patients to surgeries, tests, scans, medications, and treatments 
that offer patients no benefit while exposing them to risks of 
harm. The vast majority of these unnecessary treatments would 
not be captured by any of the studies designed to detect adverse 
events. Even unnecessary surgery, in and of itself inherently 
injurious, would be overlooked unless it resulted in an adverse 
event. The line dividing beneficial from useless testing and 
treatment is a difficult one to draw. But the work of the 
Dartmouth Institute, and other researchers, has found that about 
thirty percent of healthcare spending in the U.S. is worthless 
because it offers patients no benefit.33 That implies that an 
enormous quantity of harmful or risky tests and procedures have 
gone uncounted by the usual studies of iatrogenic injury.34 
 
28. INST. OF MED., PREVENTING MEDICATION ERRORS (2006). 
29. Tara Bishop et al., Paid Malpractice Claims for Adverse Events in 
Inpatient and Outpatient Settings, 305 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2427, 
2429 (2011). 
30. Id. at 2427. 
31. Id. at 2430. 
32. Needless to say, all of those deaths and injuries create enormous 
costs. See, e.g., John C. Goodman et al., The Social Cost of Adverse 
Medical Events, And What We Can Do About It, 30 HEALTH AFF. 
590, 590 (2011). 
33. Nicole Cafarella Lallemand, Reducing Waste in Health Care, 
HEALTH AFF. (Dec. 13, 2012), available at https://www.
healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20121213.959735/full/ 
[https://perma.cc/C2D5-JD6C]. 
34. See generally id. 
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In an effort to stimulate some appreciation of what those 
numbers mean, patient-safety experts have sometimes illustrated 
the incidence of preventable deaths resulting from medical errors 
in terms of jumbo-jet crashes.35 Why? Because sudden 
concentrations of deaths attract the attention of the news media, 
government officials, and the public, while people dying quietly, 
one at a time, spread across the nation’s healthcare systems, 
apparently are easy to overlook.36 By that more unsettling 
measure, we could be seeing six or more jumbo jets crashing each 
day, every day of every year. Even the very lowest estimates 
would translate to one jumbo jet crashing approximately every 
third day. 
Donald Berwick, former administrator of the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) was quoted saying, “[i]n 
almost no other field would consumers tolerate the frequency of 
error that is common in medicine.”37 Mark Chassin, President and 
CEO of the Joint Commission (formerly the Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO)), made a 
similar point: 
If the performance of certain high-reliability industries, 
whose standards of excellence we take for granted, suddenly 
deteriorated to the level of most health care services, some 
astounding results would occur. At a defect rate of 20 
percent, which occurs in the use of antibiotics for colds, the 
credit card industry would make daily mistakes on nine 
 
35. A Boeing 747-400 with a three-class layout can hold 416 passengers 
plus crew. The first to use this analogy in the patient safety context 
was Lucian L. Leape, Error in Medicine, 272 JAMA 1851, 1851 
(1994). 
36. For example, fear of terrorism within our borders has captivated 
our media. We pay close attention to those risks and we invest 
large sums to prevent that source of harm to our citizens. The 
number of fatalities from terrorism, inside the U.S., from 2002 
through 2016, however, was just 190 people. See ERIN MILLER & 
MICHAEL JENSEN, FACT SHEET, AMERICAN DEATHS IN TERRORIST 
ATTACKS, 1995–2016, NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF 




37. Reed Abelson, In Bid for Better Care, Surgery with a Warranty, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/
17/business/17quality.html [https://perma.cc/PZ4Z-4REN]. 
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million transactions; banks would deposit 36 million checks 
in the wrong accounts every day; and deaths from airplane 
crashes would increase one thousand-fold.38 
As Hyman and Silver comment, “[a]n error rate of 20% would 
be intolerable in the business settings identified, but error rates 
as high as 79% have been observed in health care.”39 
In sum, the incidence of iatrogenic injury and death is 
enormous, while the cost to the healthcare industry (in terms of 
compensation of the victims) is remarkably modest. Can such a 
favorable gain-loss profile be made even better? 
C. Making an Excellent Situation Better 
Ironically, an industry that pays proportionately so little to 
insure itself against the cost of accidents is the same industry that 
generates more accidental death and injury (as a byproduct of its 
work) than the combined total of all other human activity in the 
nation.40 If the industry causing the harm isn’t paying for the 
losses that it negligently produces, then who is? The bulk of these 
losses are externalized onto victims and their families, first-party 
health insurers, and taxpayers, through government insurance 
programs. 
How can a lobbyist persuade a legislature to help make this 
already highly favorable situation even more favorable to the 
industry? Answer: By turning the relatively small cost of the 
malpractice liability system into a far larger number. In order to 
accomplish this, lobbyists turn to the concept of defensive 
medicine. Healthcare providers, mostly physicians and 
hospitals—so the argument goes—are so afraid of becoming 
defendants in malpractice lawsuits that they lard needless tests 
 
38. Mark R. Chassin, Is Health Care Ready for Six Sigma Quality?, 76 
THE MILBANK Q. 565, 566–67 (1998); See also Mark R. Chassin, 
High-reliability Health Care: Getting There from Here, 91 THE 
MILBANK Q. 459, 480 (2013). 
39. David Hyman & Charles Silver, The Poor State of Health Care 
Quality in the U.S.: Is Malpractice Liability Part of the Problem or 
Part of the Solution?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 893, 949 (2005) 
[hereinafter Hyman & Silver—2005]. 
40. Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, Defensive Medicine and 
Disappearing Doctors?, 28 REG. 24, 28 (2005) [hereinafter Baicker 
& Chandra—Disappearing Doctors]. 
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and procedures onto the nation’s healthcare bill.41 No one knows 
how much all of these wasteful tests and procedures really cost 
us, but speculative amounts are offered by proponents who, given 
the nature of their assignment, reach for the largest numbers they 
can assert short of triggering disbelief or laughter. The most 
extreme of those imaginary numbers transforms the 
approximately one-quarter of one percent of healthcare costs into 
something a legislator might be persuaded to worry about. 
Various estimates have been advanced. Philip Howard, 
founder of Common Good, an organization which promotes the 
idea of removing medical malpractice disputes from conventional 
courts, floated the figure of $100 billion in 2003.42 In 2018 dollars,43 
that number grows to $137 billion. His estimate was flayed as 
“grossly exaggerated” by Hyman and Silver.44 Undeterred, others 
outbid him. A 2003 Health and Human Services (HHS) report 
gave figures of $70–126 billion,45 which is a range of $96–173 
billion in 2018 dollars. The American Tort Reform Association 
asserted annual-defensive-medicine expenditures of $200 billion,46 
which is $210 billion in 2018 dollars. Topping that, in 2014, the 
 
41. See, e.g., Tancredi & Barondess, supra note 4, at 879; Defensive 
Medicine and Medical Malpractice: Hearing before the Committee 
on Labor and Human Resources, United States Senate, 98th Cong., 
2nd Sess. (July 10, 1984); R.E. Anderson, Billions for Defense: The 
Pervasive Nature of Defensive Medicine, 159 ARCHIVES OF 
INTERNAL MED. 2399, 2399 (1999). 
42. Philip K. Howard, Legal Malpractice, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 27, 2003), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1043634286859254944 
[https://perma.cc/XXC9-WYQV]. 
43. Inflation Calculator, U.S. INFLATION CALCULATOR, https://www.
usinflationcalcualtor.com/ [https://perma.cc/E2PE-M7NL] (last 
visited Nov. 24, 2019). 
44. David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Believing Six Improbable 
Things: Medical Malpractice and Legal Fear, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 107, 113–14 (2004). 
45. U.S. DEP’T HEALTH HUM. SERVS., ADDRESSING THE NEW HEALTH 
CARE CRISIS: REFORMING THE MEDICAL LITIGATION SYSTEM TO 
IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE 11 (2003), available at 
https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/72871/medliab.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AAN8-8TWZ]. 
46. Health Cost Containment and Efficiencies, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. 
LEGIS. (Oct. 2011), http://www.ncsl.org/portals/1/documents/
health/MedicalMalReform-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZD99-
FCZT]. 
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healthcare economics firm BioScience Valuation put the amount 
above $480 billion annually.47 And Jackson Healthcare, a 
healthcare organization based in Miami, did even better, with a 
figure of $650–$850 billion,48 which could be as little as $713 
billion, or as much as $933 billion, in 2018 dollars. For 
policymakers looking for a solution to America’s exorbitant 
healthcare costs, these numbers attract attention.49 
 
47. Wayne Oliver & Jeffrey Segal, To Reduce Healthcare Costs 




48. See Physician Study: Quantifying the Cost of Defensive Medicine, 
JACKSON HEALTHCARE, https://jacksonhealthcare.com/media-
room/surveys/defensive-medicine-study-2010 [https://perma.cc/
76BJ-2A3N] (last visited Nov. 8, 2019) [hereinafter Jackson 
Healthcare Study #1]; Physicians on Medical Liability Reform 
Options: An Online Quantitative Research Study, JACKSON 
HEALTHCARE (Dec. 5, 2012), https://jacksonhealthcare.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/PDF/phys_on_med_liability_reform_
112612_weighted_by_specialty.pdf [https://perma.cc/T44C-
XK2T] [hereinafter Jackson Healthcare Study #2]. Their figures 
were arrived at by asking doctors to “guestimate” what percentage 
of the procedures that they and their colleagues order were 
motivated by concerns about malpractice litigation. Their average 
responses were twenty-six to thirty-four percent, which, when 
multiplied by the total national healthcare bill, produces those 
numbers. This guestimate was picked up by then-Congressman 
(and later, Secretary of HHS, briefly in 2017) Tom Price and 
repeated in a press release. Tom Price, Gallup: 26% of Health Care 
Dollars Spent to Fend Off Trial Bar, REPUBLICAN STUDY COMM. 
(Feb. 22, 2010), https://rsc.woodall.house.gov/news/document
single.aspx?DocumentID=171421 [https://perma.cc/L2G5-GCUU] 
(“[P]hysicians estimated that 21 percent of everything they do can 
be attributed to the practice of defensive medicine.”). 
49. Healthcare industry leaders and lobbyists have already had 
considerable success persuading legislatures to adopt a variety of 
malpractice tort reforms. Most of these reforms are aimed at 
reducing the number of patients who can bring claims, making the 
traditionally tiny proportion of injury victims who do so even tinier, 
and to reduce the amount of compensation that can be received by 
those whose claims prevail. Overall, the reforms have succeeded in 
cutting the number of malpractice claims by nearly two-thirds over 
the past several decades. See Myungho Paik et al., The Receding 
Tide of Medical Malpractice Litigation: Part I – National 
Trends, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 612, 612 (2013); See also, 
Michelle Mello et al., The Medical Liability Climate and Prospects 
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As explained in the margin, those numbers come from shaky 
foundations. But if defensive medicine actually exists in 
something like the form and extent usually asserted, then it not 
only wastes vast resources, it also adds to the dangers confronting 
patients: they are subjected to needless tests, radiation, 
medication, sometimes surgery, and other low-value (or no-value) 
medical care. By calming doctors’ fears, medical malpractice 
reform would arguably prevent hundreds of billions of dollars of 
worthless healthcare expenditures and protect patients from the 
risks associated with unnecessary and excessive healthcare. 
II. Why Commit and Why Admit? 
The reasons for engaging in defensive practices seem obvious 
at first. The healthcare industry is organized in a way that loads 
as much as possible of the insurance-cost burden of iatrogenic 
injuries onto physicians, even when much of the cause and the 
capability to prevent is within the control of larger organizational 
units. If you are a provider on whom that burden personally falls, 
then you understandably want to do something to lighten—or 
avoid—the burden. 
A. Why Engage in Defensive Medicine? 
Imagine that you could reduce the chances of your house 
burning down by (1) spending someone else’s money (for example, 
your clients’, their insurers’, or the taxpayers’ money), and (2) 
paying yourself a bonus for taking the trouble to spend those 
other people’s money. Some or many homeowners would probably 
do this. For medical malpractice, the analogy proceeds like so: 
The greater a physician perceives the risk of a malpractice lawsuit 
 
for Reform, 312 JAMA 2146 (2014). A review of the empirical 
research on the effects of these reforms found that damage caps 
have had the greatest impact: They have been found to produce 
“substantial savings” on payments to victims and to have imposed 
a “modest restraint on growth of malpractice premiums.” Allen 
Kachalia & Michelle M. Mello, New Directions in Medical Liability 
Reform, 364 N. ENG. J. MED. 1564, 1568 (2011). More than half of 
the states have adopted limitations of one form or another on 
awards of non-economic damages; some have done so for total 
damages (economic as well as so-called non-economic). These caps 
have reduced mean payment per claim by as much as forty percent. 
See FRANK A. SLOAN & LINDSEY M. CHEPKE, MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE (2008). 
Health Matrix·Volume 30·2020 
The Paradoxes of Defensive Medicine 
38 
to be and the more tests and other procedures that the physician 
orders, then the more money the physician and the industry get 
to charge and the more the risk of being sued is reduced.50 The 
desirability of that practice, at least for the practitioner, seems 
beyond debate. Wouldn’t it be crazy not to? 
But perhaps the self-serving benefits of defensive medicine are 
not as clear as they first seem. To begin with, how are physicians 
to know which actions actually will be protective? There is little 
or no empirical evidence as to which actions that are medically 
useless for patients will nevertheless reduce the risk of a 
malpractice claim being initiated. 
Moreover, how can defensive practices help when one of the 
most-cited reasons for defensive practices is said to be that 
patients and the litigation process are highly unpredictable?51 
Paradoxically, it appears that engaging in defensive practices 
bespeaks a belief in the existence of patient and legal-system 
predictability—the alleged absence of which is a major reason for 
engaging in defensive practices. Alternatively, if the defensive 
practice is effective at reducing the risk of lawsuits by reducing 
the risk of harmful error, then it’s not a defensive practice—it’s 
good medical care. 
Perhaps defensive practices are the product of superstition, 
both in a psychological and anthropological sense. Superstitious 
behavior is found in all societies and cultures.52 The noted 
anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski, while studying the people 
of the Trobriand Islands, made a discovery about the causes of 
superstitious behavior.53 Malinowski observed that the islanders 
 
50. Ann G. Lawthers et al., Physicians’ Perceptions of the Risk of 
Being Sued, 17 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 463, 470, 476, 478 
(1992). 
51. See, e.g., David M. Studdert and Michelle M. Mello, When Tort 
Resolutions Are “Wrong”: Predictors of Discordant Outcomes in 
Medical Malpractice Litigation, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 547 (2007) 
(“This pronouncement of the tort system’s inaccuracy in matching 
compensation awards to the merits of claims has become a staple 
in policy debates over medical liability reform. Assertions that the 
system is a lottery in which compensation awards are little better 
than random are commonly heard from the medical community and 
others who advocate far-reaching reforms”). 
52. BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, MAGIC, SCIENCE, AND RELIGION 29–32 
(Joseph Needham ed., 1925). 
53. Id. at 30. 
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had no superstitions associated with performing activities in 
which the relation of actions to outcomes was predictable.54 
Activities that were unpredictable and carried the risk of harm or 
loss, however, were accompanied by superstitious practices.55 
Fishing in the lagoons yielded a predicable amount of fish and 
was safe, and to this activity no magic or superstitions were 
attached.56 Fishing in the ocean, on the other hand, offered the 
chance of making an especially large haul of fish, but also the risk 
of coming home empty-handed (or not coming home at all): 
Ocean fishing was accompanied by superstitions and magic.57 
George Gmelch identified a similar pattern in our own society: 
the rituals of baseball.58 According to Gmelch, baseball players 
tend not to have superstitions in connection with fielding (which 
they accomplish successfully 98.4% of the time); their 
superstitions cluster around the less predictable activity of 
batting (which they accomplish successfully only 24.8% of the 
time).59 
Perhaps something similar is true of the doctors who engage 
in defensive medicine. Because lawsuits against doctors are so rare 
relative to the number of patient contacts—and still rare even 
when a doctor has, in fact, committed actionable-medical 
negligence60—a doctor might correlate almost any behavior (albeit 
in an illusory way) with the prospect of not being sued.61 For 
 
54. Id. at 31. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 32. 
57. Id. 




59. See id. The percentages are the overall averages for all players on 
all teams in major league baseball for the 2018 season, and they 
roughly correspond to Gmelch’s findings. Cf. 2018 MLB Team 
Statistics, BASEBALL REF., https://www.baseball-reference.com/
leagues/MLB/2018.shtml [https://perma.cc/WKG6-2PXB] (last 
visited Feb. 21, 2020). 
60. See Ashley M. Votruba & Michael J. Saks, Medical Adverse Events 
and Malpractice Litigation in Arizona: By-the-Numbers, 45 ARIZ. 
ST. L. J. 1537, 1551 (2013). 
61. According to KevinMD, a well-known weblog for and curated by 
medical residents and physicians, doctors harbor many 
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example, ordering an extra CT scan might seem to keep lawsuits 
away; then again, so might wearing a protective necklace of garlic 
bulbs. But coincidence is not even correlation: errors and harm 
that sometimes produce a malpractice lawsuit most of the time 
do not.62 And a lawsuit, whatever its disposition, is a dreaded 
experience. Nothing is dependably known (that is, evidence-
based) to reduce that very small risk to an even smaller risk.63 So, 
perhaps, defensive practices arose to provide a feeling of control 
over an uncontrollable situation. That is what all humans tend 
to do when faced with high stakes and uncontrollable risks—not 
just Trobriand Island fishermen and baseball players.64 
Though evidence that defensive practices reduce lawsuits is 
quite scarce, belief that defensive practices fend off lawsuits is 
said to be common.65 Eventually, perhaps, defensive practices 
 
superstitions indeed. See Elizabeth Breuer, M.D., Medical resident 
superstition and black clouds, KEVINMD (Oct. 22, 2010), 
https://www.kevinmd.com/blog/2010/10/med [https://perma.cc/
VLT5-HZ5Q]; See also 911Doc, MD, 7 favorite ER superstitions, 
KEVINMD (Dec. 12, 2010), https://www.kevinmd.com/blog/2010/
12/favorite-er-superstitions.html [https://perma.cc/GX3E-
XTMM]. 
62. PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL 
INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 
73 (1993) (finding that, on average, fewer than three legal claims 
are filed for every 100 negligent adverse events); See PATRICIA M. 
DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC 
POLICY 22, 23 (1985); Marlynn L. May & Daniel B. Stengel, Who 
Sues Their Doctors? How Patients Handle Medical Grievances, 24 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 105, 118 (1990) (studying why negligently 
injured patients rarely sue); TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE MYTH 3 (2005) (reviewing similar findings). 
63. The first (and perhaps only) study to find any protective effect for 
providers is said to be that of Anupam B. Jena et al., Physician 
Spending and Subsequent Risk of Malpractice Claims: Observa-
tional Study, 351 BMJ h5516 (2015); See Molly Walker, ‘Defensive 
Medicine’ Pays Off, Study Suggests, MEDPAGE TODAY (Nov. 5, 
2015), https://www.medpagetoday.com/practicemanagement/
medicolegal/54498 [https://perma.cc/8JR9-PBVQ]. 
64. See generally STUART VYSE, BELIEVING IN MAGIC: THE PSYCHOLOGY 
OF SUPERSTITION (2013). 
65. Aaron Carroll, Defensive Medicine Isn’t So Cut and Dry, THE 
INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST (Feb. 8, 2013, 8:55 AM), https://
theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/defensive-medicine-isnt-so-
cut-and-dry/ [https://perma.cc/8LX6-KWN6]. 
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become part of the folklore of the healthcare industry, and not 
just something that a few individuals decide to do of their own 
accord. Physicians and other providers are advised by teachers or 
colleagues, and are also inundated with reading materials, 
suggesting that one or another kind of self-protection might 
help.66 
Furthermore, lawyers sometimes advise physicians on how to 
legally practice “safe” medicine. A number of years ago, one of 
your authors attended a meeting of a medical school and its 
teaching hospital on the topic of medical malpractice. At this 
large, well-attended gathering, one of the speakers was the 
hospital’s lawyer, who previously had been that state’s attorney 
general. One piece of “advice” that he offered to the assembled 
medical students, faculty, and staff was that, if in doubt, they 
should deliver babies by cesarean section. Why? Simple, he 
explained: I’d much rather defend a lawsuit for a needless 
cesarean in which the baby came out healthy, than a case for the 
failure to perform one that resulted in a damaged baby.67 
B. When is Defensive Medicine Actually Defensive? 
Perhaps the logic of diagnosis and treatment68 teaches a 
doctor that some actions will almost certainly reduce the risk of 
harm, and in turn, the risk of a lawsuit. But such obvious benefits 
to the patient—which, logically, are benefits to the doctor—make 
those actions strange candidates for inclusion in the category of 
defensive medicine. Keeping patients safe and healthy should be 
 
66. OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-H-602, DEFENSIVE MEDICINE AND 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, at 34 (July 1994), available at https://ota
.fas.org/reports/9405.pdf [https://perma.cc/AZU7-DHG7] [herein-
after OTA-H-602]. 
67. C-sections carry their own risks to the mother, including 
postoperative adhesions, incisional hernias (which could require 
further surgery), and wound infections, with the rate of adverse 
outcomes being slightly greater than that of vaginal deliveries. See 
Aaron B. Caughney et al., Safe Prevention of the Primary 
Cesarean Delivery, AM. J. OF OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 179, 
179–80 (Mar. 2014). Professor Saks waited in vain for someone in 
the audience to stand up and say something like: We are the 
doctors, not you. We work for the patients, not for you. We are 
not going to practice medicine in a manner calculated to make life 
easier for our insurers and our lawyers. But, no one uttered a word. 
68. For a discussion on the diagnostic process, see generally IMPROVING 
DIAGNOSIS IN HEALTH CARE 119 (Erin Balogh et al. eds., 2015). 
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the central goal of the healthcare industry. Recall that the 
essential definition of defensive medicine is that it helps the 
doctor while doing little or no good for the patient. Where is the 
line that divides well-intended, low-value care from self-dealing 
and defensive practices? 
Atul Gawande tells of the time that his own child, who had 
fallen down some stairs, was taken to an emergency room, 
examined, given a CT scan, observed, and cleared to go home. 
Gawande explains that he “bullied the doctor into admitting him” 
to the hospital for 24 hours and obtaining a repeat scan the next 
day; as expected, “the scan and the patient were fine.”69 
Suppose that the ER doctor had ordered the extra care 
himself, without pressure from Gawande to do so (some in fact 
do70). Was the supposedly excessive caution “defensive”; or, was 
it the kind of care that a doctor would prefer for the doctor’s own 
family, but which is presumably cost-ineffective and therefore 
normally foregone? The inherent cost-ineffectiveness might make 
it wasteful, but can it be said to be “defensive”? Gawande’s story 
reminds us that nervous patients or families—even doctors 
themselves—sometimes want more care than what is thought to 
be necessary; and doctors sometimes comply with the patients’ 
wishes. But is that defensive medicine? 
Gawande shared another example. Another surgeon was 
scheduled to remove a patient’s thyroid because it contained 
microcarcinoma—tiny, slow-growing cells that could, but were 
very unlikely to, become cancerous.71 The patient wound up in 
Gawande’s office because the original surgeon was attending to 
his own health issues.72 Gawande suggested an alternative course 
of treatment to the patient: the risk of cancer was minimal, the 
risks of harm from the surgery were significant, and life without 
 
69. Atul Gawande, The Cost Conundrum, NEW YORKER (May 25, 
2009), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/06/01/the-
cost-conundrum [https://perma.cc/C6G5-LVG5]. 
70. See, e.g., Perry Hookman, In Defense of Defensive Medicine?, DR. 
PERRY HOOKMAN BLOG (June 28, 2009), http://drperryhookman
.blogspot.com/2009/06/ [https://perma.cc/65QB-Q4AH]. 
71. Atul Gawande, Overkill, NEW YORKER (May 4, 2015), https://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/05/11/overkill-atul-gawande 
[https://perma.cc/9QF8-CHUQ] [hereinafter Gawande—Overkill]. 
72. Id. 
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a thyroid could be unpleasant.73 Additionally, he explained that 
her thyroid could be monitored and, if the cells started to grow, 
could always be removed later.74 
At this point in the narrative, one might begin to think that 
the patient was lucky to have crossed Gawande’s path because, 
surely, he has convinced her to avoid a needless surgery. But the 
punchline of the story is that the patient couldn’t bear the 
thought of even a miniscule risk of cancer and had her 
thyroidectomy anyway.75 
Or consider this question, which one of us posed to his law-
school seminar: What should a doctor do when a patient asks for 
a medication that the doctor knows will be useless for the 
patient’s condition, but the patient is not convinced and insists 
on trying the drug anyway? A medical student (who was also a 
law student) in the class said that she would write the 
prescription that the patient wanted. The student explained that 
the patient will go elsewhere and find another doctor to write the 
prescription, so it would be better to keep the patient’s business 
and try to guide the patient over time to more beneficial 
treatments. The student’s response demonstrates that 
unnecessary treatment, with its waste and risks of harm, might 
not always be the doctor’s fault—or desire. Indeed, patients 
sometimes manage to put themselves at risk and waste healthcare 
dollars, and their doctors merely go along. 
While some presumptively defensive practices seem to benefit 
(or at the very least do not harm) patients, other defensive 
actions impose potential or actual harm, such as radiation, 
infection, falls, and harmful drug reactions. By increasing the risk 
of harm, these defensive practices increase the potential for a 
lawsuit—the very thing the doctor was hoping to avoid. So, from 
the provider’s viewpoint, a tradeoff is being made: the same 
actions that might decrease the risk of a lawsuit in some ways 
simultaneously increase the risk in other ways.76 Presumably, the 
tradeoff is seen by the provider as favoring the interests of the 





76. Nested within this cost-to-benefit judgment there is, no doubt, 
another query: the patient’s benefit-to-risk judgement. 
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C. Why Would Anyone Admit to Engaging in Defensive Medicine? 
It is one thing to engage in defensive practices, but quite 
another to admit to the deed. Why do so? After all, defensively 
ordering tests or treatments when the doctor believes that the 
procedures offer no, or minimal, prospect of benefitting the 
patient—but serve only the doctor’s self-interests—can be illegal 
as well as unethical. Billing for needless services is a form of 
healthcare fraud. The Medicare claim form, for example, requires 
providers to certify that the services shown on the form were 
medically indicated and necessary for the health of the patient.77 
If the services are, in the belief of the doctor, not medically 
necessary, the claim is false. 
The principal gain of defensive medicine for the provider (i.e., 
protection from a lawsuit) is arguably a fraudulently-obtained 
benefit. A prosecutor who has evidence of such behavior could 
easily see criminality in it. If the prosecutor wanted to act, an 
obvious charge would be criminal fraud.78 If the procedure exposes 
the patient to risk of injury, then the physician might also be 
charged with reckless endangerment.79 If the defensive practice 
subjects the patient to wounds or radiation, then the prosecutor 
might see the crime of assault and battery—because the patient 
 
77. CMS-1500, Health Insurance Claim Form, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/CMS-Forms/
CMS-Forms/Downloads/CMS1500.pdf [https://perma.cc/86U2-
MSMP] (last visited Feb. 24, 2020). 
78. Fraud is a “knowing misrepresentation or knowing concealment of 
a material fact made to induce another to act to his or her 
detriment.” Fraud, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see 
David A. Hyman, Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Market Change, 
Social Norms, and the Trust “Reposed in the Workmen”, 30 J. OF 
LEGAL STUD. 531 (June 2001); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., 
GAO-12-820, HEALTH CARE FRAUD: TYPES OF PROVIDERS 
INVOLVED IN MEDICARE, MEDICAID, AND THE CHILDREN’S HEALTH 
INSURANCE PROGRAM CASES (2012), available at https://www.
gao.gov/assets/650/647849.pdf [https://perma.cc/HNR2-EWZK] 
[hereinafter GAO-12-820]. 
79. The crime of reckless endangerment consists of a perpetrator 
recklessly exposing a victim to a substantial risk of imminent death 
or physical injury. A needless biopsy, surgery, or perhaps even 
exposure to radiation could be viewed as constituting the requisite 
risk of harm. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. §13-1201 (2019). A 
needless biopsy, surgery, or, perhaps, unnecessary exposure to 
radiation could constitute the requisite risk of harm. 
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was subjected to injury without having granted valid informed 
consent.80 
Leaving aside civil or criminal liability, defensive medicine 
violates the principles of medical ethics.81 According to the 
American Medical Association’s (AMA) Code of Medical Ethics, 
one ethical precept of medicine is that, “[a] physician shall . . . be 
honest in all professional interactions.”82 Moreover, physicians are 
duty bound to report “to appropriate entities” colleagues they 
find “engaging in fraud or deception.”83 Most important, the 
model code instructs that “[a] physician shall, while caring for a 
patient, regard responsibility to the patient as paramount.”84 
Defensive medicine turns all of this on its head: the interests of 
the physician are set above the interests of the patient by an act 
of fraud. 
So, again, why admit to engaging in defensive medicine? If 
you were a physician and you realized that you routinely, 
intentionally practiced in ways that were unethical, illegal, 
universally condemned as wasteful of precious healthcare 
resources, a “deviation from sound medical practice,”85 and 
potentially harmful to the patients who placed their trust in 
you—would you take every opportunity to proclaim your 
misdeeds from the rooftops and the op-ed pages? 
In fact, there was a time not very long ago when doctors did 
not take kindly to the suggestion that they were practicing 
defensive medicine. The accusation was regarded as an insult, an 
accusation of misconduct, and the response was denial, not 
enthusiastic affirmation. Medical commentary in the early 1970s 
spoke of “the spectre of defensive medicine, with the connotation 
 
80. For valid informed consent, a physician would transparently 
divulge to the patient that the procedure the physician wishes to 
perform is expected to have no benefit to the patient but might 
benefit the doctor if patient care goes badly. See Mohr v. Williams, 
104 N.W. 12, 13 (Minn. 1905). 
81. See generally AMA Principles of Medical Ethics, AMA, 
https://www.ama-assn.org/about/publications-newsletters/ama-
principles-medical-ethics [https://perma.cc/J6VQ-7TQV] (last 




85. Studdert et al., supra note 5, at 2609–2610. 
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that actions were motivated primarily by the desire to avoid 
malpractice liability,” and argued that it was not happening.86 
Physician and attorney Don Harper Mills was part of an 
AMA Board of Trustees conference on medical costs in 1964.87 It 
was his task to attempt to determine how much the malpractice 
litigation system was contributing to the costs of health care.88 
He found it easy “to establish the cost of [liability] insurance as a 
direct effect of malpractice litigation on health care, but . . . much 
more difficult to consider the indirect costs that physicians might 
induce through the mechanism of defensive medicine.”89 He 
surveyed physicians and learned that about twenty-five percent 
of X-rays were, in the view of the doctors, unnecessary.90 But the 
doctors said that they performed them not because of malpractice 
concerns, but in response to pressure from patients who had been 
injured in accidents and whose lawyers were preparing cases 
against motorists or others alleged to be responsible for the 
injuries.91 As to laboratory tests, he found that no more than five 
percent were thought by doctors to be unnecessary, and of those, 
only a fraction were being ordered out of “medicolegal 
considerations.”92 
Another study found “medicolegal factors” to be involved in 
only one percent of laboratory tests. Of those, defensive practice 
was not the main factor said to motivate the tests being ordered. 
The authors of that research added that, “this study was 
conducted shortly after a large increase in professional liability 
insurance costs . . . which was accompanied by extensive public 
and professional debate on the problem of malpractice 
litigation,”93 to further support their conclusion that malpractice 
fears did not cause doctors to order needless tests. 
 
86. Frank W. Kiel, Medical Malpractice Claims Against the Army, 75 
MIL. L. REV. 1, 9 n. 22 (1977). 
87. Don Harper Mills, Information Please, 6 J LEGAL MED. 255, 256–
257 (1985). 





93. Bradley G. Wertman et al., Why Do Physicians Order Laboratory 
Tests?, 243 JAMA 2080, 2081 (1980). 
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A 1971 paper reviewed the literature of defensive practices, 
finding “the most significant allegation” to be that “the threat of 
malpractice litigation raises the cost of medical care by inducing 
physicians to overutilize diagnostic and treatment procedures.”94 
Citing half of a dozen studies, the review concluded that “the 
allegation that a physician responds to the increased threat of a 
malpractice suit by practicing defensive medicine has not been 
verified.”95 Its own studies of physicians in North Carolina and 
California (conducted by asking physicians to respond to 
hypothetical scenarios) concluded that some defensive medicine 
was detected, but that “the practice is not extensive and does not 
have as significant an impact as previously alleged.”96 Most of 
those engaged in what appeared to be defensive practices argued 
that whatever protection a test or treatment might offer the 
doctor was outweighed by the medical benefits it provided to 
patients. One interesting defensive practice that developed in 
response to the perceived threat of malpractice litigation was to 
keep more “detailed records of examinations and treatments.”97 
Most of the doctors in the study felt that the innovation of 
keeping careful patient records had medical as well as legal-
defense benefits. Indeed, a 1974 article in the Journal of the 
American Medical Association argued that “[d]efensive medicine 
is good medicine.”98 In short, doctors said they didn’t do it—until 
they started saying they do. 
Today, the existence, magnitude, cost, and evils of defensive 
medicine are touted widely and loudly by the healthcare industry. 
In fact, most doctors now insist they and their colleagues are 
practicing defensive medicine; in reporting its survey findings, one 
large healthcare organization concluded that “[n]ine out of 10 
physicians reported practicing defensive medicine . . . in an effort 
to avoid lawsuits.”99 A follow-up study, by the Gallup 
Organization, found that 73 percent of physicians acknowledged 
 
94. Duke Law J. Editorial Bd., The Medical Malpractice Threat: A 
Study of Defensive Medicine, 1971 DUKE L. J. 939, 942 (1971). 
95. Id. at 943. 
96. Id. at 956–57. 
97. Id. at 963. 
98. Richard P. Bergen, Defensive Medicine Is Good Medicine, 228 J. 
AM. MED. ASS’N 1188, 1189 (1974). 
99. Jackson Healthcare Study #1, supra note 48. 
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that “they had practiced some form of defensive medicine in the 
past 12 months,” and that such “[p]hysicians attribute 26 percent 
of overall healthcare costs to the practice of defensive 
medicine.”100 In another study of 824 specialists in surgery, 
obstetrics, neurosurgery, emergency medicine and others, 93 
percent reported practicing defensive medicine, such as ordering 
unnecessary CTs, biopsies, and MRIs, and prescribing excessive 
antibiotics.101 A more recent study found that 91 percent of 
physicians believe that defensive medicine exists, resulting in the 
administration of “more tests and procedures than necessary.”102 
In a broader study of drivers of healthcare costs, many 
physicians—of various specialties—”identified defensive medicine 
as their primary reason for ordering additional tests, estimating 
that it was responsible for 20–50 percent of their orders.”103 These 
facts don’t confirm whether or not physicians actually practice 
defensively on such a scale; they do, however, indicate that 
physicians seem to think that they do, or at least are eager to say 
that they do. 
The spokespersons and lobbyists for the healthcare industry 
promote the existence and the impact of defensive medicine and 
do not hesitate to emphasize how terrible it is. They argue that 
among its worst evils is that it imposes a major burden on society 
by wasting healthcare dollars. They do not wonder whether it 
exists or not. Industry lobbyists insist that it does and, what’s 
more, they have a solution for it. Their remedy is (more) 
malpractice liability reforms to ease doctors’ fear of lawsuits, 
which will enable them to wean themselves from their defensive 
ways.104   
 
100. Jackson Healthcare Study #2, supra note 48. 
101. Studdert et al., supra note 5, at 2612. 
102. Tara Bishop et al., Physicians’ Views on Defensive Medicine: A 
National Survey, 170 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 1081, 1081 
(2010). 
103. Jonas B. Green, The Malpractice Muddle, 29 HEALTH AFF. 2355, 
2355 (2010) (aggregating results from various specialties, included 
surgeons, internists, anesthesiologists, family physicians, emergency 
physicians, and medical subspecialists). 
104. See Anderson, supra note 41, at 2399–2400. 
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III. Does Defensive Medicine Actually Occur? 
For serious researchers, the defensive-medicine hypothesis 
presents a challenging mystery: Does it now, or did it ever, 
actually exist? What has emerged from their research is a mosaic 
of inconsistent and contradictory findings, with most of the tiles 
in the mosaic simply missing. The main questions to be asked are: 
(1) Do healthcare providers really engage in defensive medical 
practices? (2) If so, how much is it done and how much waste and 
harm does it generate? And, if that amount is substantial, then 
(3) what effective and efficient steps could be taken to reduce the 
problem? 
Currently, the best answer to the first two questions is that 
there is no answer, at least not any based on sound and sufficient 
data. As will become evident from our review of the research, 
infra, thoughtful researchers regard the answers as being 
remarkably elusive.105 Their consensus belief is that, if defensive 
medicine exists, whatever its extent, the dollar cost of wasteful 
procedures attributable to defensive medicine is a thin shadow of 
what the industry’s campaigners argue it is. Consequently, 
reforms of tort law are unable to make much of a contribution to 
bringing down America’s unusually high healthcare costs. 
Let’s unpack those findings and conclusions. The essential 
challenge to researchers is that because multiple motives overlap 
and overlay each other, the research must find a way to 
disentangle a set of confounded motives. When a doctor orders a 
test or recommends a procedure, what has driven that choice? As 
discussed above, it could be self-protection, serving the needs of 
the patient, or the desire to make money. Under the fee-for-
service model that has dominated American healthcare, it is 
axiomatic that the more services provided, the more services for 
which the industry can bill. As countless researchers, policy 
analysts, reformers, and commentators have pointed out, all of 
the incentives in the healthcare system—not just money, but 
medical training, professional norms, patient desires, and almost 
 
105. Yet, many of those same researchers emerge from their work 
exactly where they started—pretty sure that defensive medicine 
occurs; based, obviously, on something other than sound research 
evidence. It is as if they are saying “it’s got to be there; we just 
can’t find good evidence of it.” See Michael Frakes, Defensive 
Medicine and Obstetric Practices, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 457, 
461–62 (2012). 
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everything else—point toward doing more: test more, scan more, 
treat more.106 Defensive medicine is only one of a number of causes 
of excessive and unnecessary care. How is one to separate the 
motivation of lawsuit fear from the numerous other forces that 
all push towards the same outcome? 
How exactly does one define defensive medicine? If healthcare 
providers feel pressured to do medically desirable things to avoid 
malpractice—wash their hands, follow good medical practices, 
keep accurate patient records—is that “defensive”? Some believe 
that it is. If this is the case, however, then one could argue that 
the malpractice system is working as intended and producing 
desirable effects, since it has incentivized effective and safe 
medical practices. This can also work the other way around: 
Practices that have little value for patients, but that seemingly 
protect the doctor, might become routine practices. In that case, 
many practitioners would not realize that these were originally 
defensive tactics. Doctors using such procedures might think they 
are not acting defensively, but are instead just following standard 
practice, although what they are doing could still be understood 
as defensive practice. What if a doctor realizes that a given 
diagnostic or treatment procedure has potential value for the 
patient—and a potentially defensive benefit for the doctor? Is 
that dual-premised benefit “defensive,” or not? 
In 1994, the congressional Office of Technology Assessment 
(OTA) proposed the following oft-employed definition of 
defensive medicine: “Defensive medicine occurs when doctors 
order tests, procedures, or visits, or avoid high-risk patients or 
procedures, primarily (but not necessarily solely) to reduce their 
exposure to malpractice liability.”107 Others have developed polar 
definitions such as “positive” defensive medicine—“assurance 
behavior,” taking extra steps—and “negative” defensive 
 
106. See, e.g., Gawande—Overkill, supra note 71; Ity Shurtz, 
Malpractice Law, Physicians’ Financial Incentives, and Medical 
Treatment: How Do they Interact?, 57 J. L. & ECON. 1 (Feb. 2014) 
(finding that physicians are performing fewer procedures that incur 
expenses and increasing services that are deemed more profitable 
to execute; and, when procedures become more profitable to 
perform, the financial incentives tend to offset the malpractice 
liability concerns of providing the service); Jonathan Bergman et 
al., Service Intensity and Physician Income: Conclusions from 
Medicare’s Physician Data Release, 175 J. AM. MED. ASS’N: 
INTERNAL MED. 297, 298 (2015). 
107. OTA-H-602, supra note 66, at 13. 
Health Matrix·Volume 30·2020 
The Paradoxes of Defensive Medicine 
51 
medicine—“avoidance behavior,” refraining from treating certain 
patients or using certain procedures. Other factors in some 
definitions include whether the defensive practice is conscious or 
unconscious, or whether the action is taken solely or primarily for 
the doctor’s benefit rather than the patient’s.108 The clearest 
definition is Sloan and Shadle’s purely economic analysis: “only 
care for which expected cost exceeds expected benefits” counts as 
defensive medicine.109 Whether conduct is “defensive” or not will 
sometimes, or often, depend on the definitional lens through 
which the behavior is being viewed. Thus, one might want to take 
note of a researcher’s conceptual and operational definitions of 
defensive medicine as part of assessing whether a study and its 
findings succeed in answering policy questions of concern. 
The studies that have been undertaken fall into three basic 
groupings. The first, “direct physician surveys,” simply ask 
providers what they do and why they do it.110 The second, 
“clinical scenario surveys,” ask doctors how they would treat 
patients who present with various symptoms and histories. The 
doctors choose from a set of options what clinical actions they 
would take and to indicate what factors led to their choices. The 
third consist of “multivariate statistical analyses,” an assortment 
of complex analytics111 of existing datasets. These tests might be 
able to reveal the impact of malpractice risk on actual utilization 
of medical services. 
Each of these types of research, owing to its own particular 
strengths and limitations, has fallen short of providing sufficiently 
 
108. DIANE E. HOFFMAN & BRADLEY HERRING, REPORT TO THE 
MARYLAND HEALTH SERVICES COST REVIEW COMMISSION ON 




109. Sloan & Shadle, supra note 4, at 481. 
110. For example, “Does fear or threat of malpractice liability influence 
whether you use additional diagnostic or therapeutic procedures?” 
or, “How often do you practice defensive medicine?” See, e.g., 
HAROLD J. BURSZTAJN ET AL., FEAR OF MALPRACTICE LIABILITY 
AND ITS ROLE IN CLINICAL DECISION MAKING (1991); Jackson 
Healthcare Study #2, supra note 48. 
111. See O. Paliy & V. Shankar, Application of Multivariate Statistical 
Analyses of Existing Datasets, 25 MOL. ECOL. 1032, 1083 (2016) 
(demonstrating various multivariate statistical analyses in Box 1). 
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sound and complete answers to the most important questions 
about defensive medicine. One general problem that can haunt 
any type of study is the “file drawer problem.”112 This problem is 
a consequence of an important type of publication bias wherein 
studies that find no effects—the data do not show that X causes 
Y—are less likely to be accepted for publication than those 
finding a measurable effect—the data support a conclusion that 
X causes Y. To illustrate the file drawer problem, imagine that a 
researcher hypothesizes that singing in the shower prevents 
cancer. The researcher carries out seventeen studies, all of which 
fail to show a protective relationship between singing and cancer. 
Those results wind up in the “file drawer”—if not the 
wastebasket. The eighteenth test yields the hypothesized results; 
they find a home in a journal. When others search the research 
literature to see whether singing protects against cancer, the one 
positive study will be found. The seventeen null findings will not 
be found. This kind of selection bias also means that the one 
finding that did get published likely was a false conclusion 
resulting from type I error.113 When other researchers try to 
replicate the finding that singing prevents cancer, and they 
cannot replicate it, we have an instance of replication failure. 114 
For present purposes, the file-drawer problem means that, of 
equally well-done studies, those that find a measurable effect are 
more likely to have become part of the literature than those not 
finding an effect. Dim and potentially distorted as the light might 
be that this body of research casts, it is all that anyone has with 
which to answer the questions. 
 
112. Robert Rosenthal, File Drawer Problem and Tolerance for Null 
Results, 86 PSYCHOL. BULL. 638, 638 (1979). 
113. In statistical-hypothesis testing, “type I error” is a rejection of the 
null hypothesis when the null hypothesis is true. In other words, it 
is a research conclusion that suggests that a relationship exists, 
when in reality it does not exist. Type 1 Error, STAT TREK, 
https://stattrek.com/statistics/dictionary.aspx?definition=type
_i_error [https://perma.cc/L9MP-BHZG] (last visited Nov. 23, 
2019). 
114. Theodore D. Sterling, Publication Decisions and Their Possible 
Effects on Inferences Drawn from Tests of Significance—or Vice 
Versa, 54 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 30 (1959). This problem likely is one 
of the reasons for the “replication crisis” that is being experienced 
in biomedical, economic, and other areas of research, where 
published findings cannot be replicated. Research communities in 
various fields are hard at work trying to solve it. 
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A. Direct Physician Surveys 
As we have seen, several decades ago, physicians responded 
to surveys asking about their defensive practices by denying that 
they engaged in them. Rather, they said, they ordered tests and 
procedures for reasons of sound medical practice. Sometime 
during the 1970s their answers began to turn around. Today, the 
same professional populations overwhelmingly insist that they do 
engage in defensive practices, generating high rates of reported 
defensive medical practice that, as noted earlier, sometimes reach 
above ninety percent.115 
What such percentages mean is a bit mysterious. Perhaps the 
leap from low numbers to high numbers describes the reality of 
different times and different behavior. Or, perhaps, what has 
changed is the politically correct answer to the question. For 
strategic reasons, what was once a badge of shame has arguably 
become a badge of honor.116 But their actual and reported 
actions—and their actual and reported rationales—are not always 
in synch. Survey respondents are quite capable of answering 
consequential questions strategically—often in line with their 
tribe’s current norms—rather than offering genuinely candid 
responses.117 In the research business, this is known as “social 
 
115. See, e.g., Studdert et al., supra note 5, at 2612 (finding that ninety-
three percent of physicians in high-risk specialties during a period 
of increasing insurance costs in one state reported that they 
engaged in defensive practices; one third of whom even admitted 
recommending unnecessary and invasive procedures); Jackson 
Healthcare Study #1, supra note 48 (finding ninety-two percent in 
an earlier survey conducted by Jackson alone); MASS. MED. SOC’Y, 
INVESTIGATION OF DEFENSIVE MEDICINE IN MASSACHUSETTS (2008) 
(finding that eighty-three percent of respondents reported that they 
engaged in defensive practices); Jackson Healthcare Study #2, 
supra note 48 (finding that seventy-five percent of surveyed 
physicians reported practicing defensive medicine primarily “to 
avoid being named in a potential lawsuit.”). 
116. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Welfare Polls: A Synthesis, 81 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1875, 1905 (2006) (discussing things to worry about in 
survey responses, among them that “the respondent is behaving 
strategically and not answering the question truthfully . . . .”). 
117. Response Bias: Definition and Examples, STATS. HOW TO (June 
24, 2015), https://www.statisticshowto.datasciencecentral.com/
response-bias/ [https://perma.cc/ZD9U-JK4F]. This is not to say 
that survey research cannot be useful for some other purposes, such 
as asking someone to look at a product and declare whom they 
believe manufactured it (as in trademark-infringement litigation). 
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desirability bias.”118 People want to look good to those whose 
opinions matter to them. 
These are the most obvious methodological weaknesses of self-
report surveys.119 Others include: (1) low response rates, especially 
by busy professionals; (2) recall biases; (3) heuristic biases; and 
(4) questions that could not possibly elicit meaningful answers. 
We describe some of these. 
Typically, owing to the time pressures on practitioners and 
the frequency of inquiries directed to them, physician surveys 
have low response rates.120 The low response rates allow 
respondents with stronger feelings about the subject matter to be 
over-represented in the sample. Logically, if a survey receives few 
responses, and defensive practitioners disproportionately respond, 
then the resulting sampling bias will drive up the “average” 
amount of defensive practice reported. 
Similarly, a variety of psychological distortions, chief among 
them the tendency to inaccurately recall an event, can play havoc 
with self-reports.121 Even where respondents try their best to 
provide candid answers, instant recall of the choices they made 
 
See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond, Reference Guide on Survey 
Research, FED. JUD. CTR., REF. MANUAL ON SCI. EVIDENCE, 359, 
366 (3rd ed. 2011). 
118. Ivar Krumpal, Determinants of Social Desirability Bias in Sensitive 
Surveys: A Literature Review, 47 QUALITY & QUANTITY 2025, 2025 
(2013). 
119. Id. 
120. In reviewing direct physician surveys conducted up through the 
1990s, OTA complained of response rates under fifty percent, which 
created unacceptable risks of unrepresentativeness and 
participation bias. OTA-H-602, supra note 66. Since then, response 
rates seem to have fallen further. For example, in the 
Massachusetts Medical Society Investigation of Defensive Medicine 
in Massachusetts, only 23.6 percent of sampled doctors responded. 
MASS. MED. SOC’Y, supra note 115. The survey by Jackson 
Healthcare consisted of “over 3000” physicians out of 138,686 
invited to respond—a two-percent response rate. Jackson 
Healthcare Study #1, supra note 48. Conversely, David M. 
Studdert and colleagues were able to achieve a sixty-five percent 
response rate. Studdert et al., supra note 5, at 2610. 
121. ROGER TOURANGEAU, LANCE J. RIPS & KENNETH RASINSKI, THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF SURVEY RESPONSE 86, 125, 143–144 (2000). The 
balance of this paragraph are a few examples from a large catalog 
of such problems. Id. 
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in each case over a defined period of time, or mentally averaging 
them, can prove to be difficult or impossible. Efforts to provide 
answers suffer from unintentional cognitive biases. For example, 
when asked to estimate the frequency of occurrence of something, 
our minds equate the ease (or difficulty) of recall with higher (or 
lower) frequency. This is known to cognitive scientists as the 
“availability” heuristic. If survey respondents have heard others 
offer “guestimates,” then they too will tend to conform their own 
guestimates to those they have heard before. This is known as the 
heuristic of anchoring.122 
Direct physician surveys typically pose vague or general 
questions; responses can hardly be any less vague or general.123 
Respondents typically are asked whether concerns about 
malpractice have caused them to practice more defensively.124 
Sometimes they are asked how frequently concerns about 
malpractice liability caused them to do so (“never, rarely, 
sometimes, often”).125 The responses to such questions cannot 
 
122. In the classic experiment on this effect, a wheel of fortune was spun 
that (unbeknownst to the research participants) was set to stop 
randomly at either the number ten or sixty-five. Participants were 
asked whether the percentage of African nations in the U.N. was 
greater or smaller than that number. Then they were asked to 
estimate the percentage of nations in the U.N. that were African. 
Those participants whose wheel had stopped at ten generated lower 
estimates (twenty-five percent on average) than participants whose 
wheel stopped at sixty-five (forty-five percent on average). Amos 
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1128 (1974). 
123. GEORGE F. BISHOP, THE ILLUSION OF PUBLIC OPINION: FACT AND 
ARTIFACT IN AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION POLLS 14 (2004) 
(commenting on “the fog of public opinion created by the 
ambiguity of language used in most survey questions. Ever since 
the inception of modern polling, survey researchers have struggled 
with the Achilles heel of their measuring instrument: the frequently 
vague meaning of survey questions”; noting “the penchant of many 
respondents for answering questions which have no meaning for 
them . . . .”; and noting that “[r]espondents answer vaguely worded 
questions in idiosyncratic ways.”). 
124. Examples of the language can be found in OTA-H-602, supra note 
66; Studdert et al., supra note 5, at 2610; Jackson Healthcare Study 
#2, supra note 48. 
125. As to these issue-quantifying efforts, see N.C. Schaeffer, Hardly 
Ever or Constantly? Group Comparisons and Vague Quantifiers, 
55 PUB. OPINION Q. 395 (1991) (finding that categories using vague 
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offer much specificity: exactly how many procedures, of what 
kinds, under what circumstances, and with what costs or benefits, 
are defensive. Whether 3% or 93% of doctors say that sometime 
in the preceding year they did something to someone that they 
felt was defensive in nature, we still know very little about how 
common or how costly the problem is. 
Discerning our motives for doing something can be more 
difficult than most of us assume. Whatever the real cause of our 
behavior, we are capable of quickly inventing a plausible 
explanation which might or might not have something to do with 
why we did what we did.126 For this reason, serious researchers 
are skeptical about the usefulness of the just-ask approach to 
learning about the incidence of defensive practices. The OTA 
review considered the direct physician survey results to be “highly 
 
quantifiers—for example, “a few,” “some,” and “many”—are 
interpreted differently across respondents). 
126. See, e.g., John M. Darley & C. Daniel Batson, “From Jerusalem to 
Jericho”: A Study of Situational and Dispositional Variables in 
Helping Behavior, 27 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 100, 107-08 
(1973). In their experiment, volunteer seminary students at 
Princeton University were sent across campus to record an ad that 
they were to improvise along the way. It asked them to explain 
why they were pursuing their careers. Half were assigned to talk 
about the practical benefits of a career as a minister; the other half 
were assigned to talk about service to others. Each of those halves 
was further subdivided, with half given a recording time that 
allowed a leisurely walk to the studio and the other half an 
appointment for which they would have to hustle to not to be late. 
Along the way, an actor who feigned illness was lying by the path, 
pleading for help. Most of the seminarians who were unrushed 
stopped to help, but most of those who were in a hurry passed by 
the sick person. That seemingly trivial variable—the press of 
time—was the major predictor of whether they offered help or not, 
rather than factors we or they would expect to matter, such as 
personality, backgrounds, attitudes and beliefs related to religious 
commitment, service to others, and so on. But when asked what 
led them to help or not, participants in such studies are usually 
clueless about what really drove their actions (or inaction). See 
generally id. Relatedly, as Jonathan Haidt has made famous 
through his metaphor of the “emotional dog and its rational tail,” 
when we are required to offer reasons for our behavior, we are 
remarkably skilled at formulating rational-sounding explanations 
which might have nothing to do with the actual drivers of our 
behavior, which even the behaver is not sure of. Jonathan Haidt, 
The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist 
Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 814 (2001). 
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suspect,” especially due to something researchers today would call 
“priming”—the questions “invariably prompt responding 
physicians to consider malpractice liability as a factor in their 
practice choices.”127 That is, if the question cannot be asked 
without raising concerns for litigation and defensive medicine, 
then the answers that are elicited will be infected by concerns 
about, and efforts to connect answers to, litigation and defensive 
medicine.128 And, if it’s difficult to accurately access the 
competing factors in one’s own decisions, imagine how much 
harder it would be to accurately discern what one’s colleagues did 
and why they decided to do those things. 
Nevertheless, pollsters sometimes ask unanswerable 
questions129 and, because people responding to surveys can 
generate replies to any question posed, responses will come 
forth.130 Surveys of belief and opinion are sure to generate data. 
This happens even when those being polled do not know, and 
could not know, the actual answer to the questions asked.131 A 
well-known Marist poll illustrates the point. When researchers 
asked whether space aliens exist, sixty percent of survey 
respondents answered, “yes.”132 When those responding 
 
127. OTA-H-602, supra note 66, at 5. 
128. Id. 
129. Familiar examples are questions about what will happen at some 
time in the future. See, e.g., Melia Robinson, Here’s What 
Americans Think the World Will Be Like in 2036, BUS. INSIDER 
(June 27, 2016, 7:58 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/
predictions-about-the-future-2016-6 [https://perma.cc/A8FA-
V2C2] (explaining causes of (or solutions to) problems that 
respondents can do no better than guess about or matters on which 
the respondents have no experience or knowledge whatsoever). 
130. JON A. KROSNICK & STANLEY PRESSER, QUESTION AND 
QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN 5–6 (Peter v. Mardsen & James D. Wright 
eds., 2d. 2010) (“A more dramatic shortcut is to skip the retrieval 
and judgment steps altogether. That is, respondents may interpret 
each question superficially and select what they believe will appear 
to be a reasonable answer. The answer is selected without reference 
to any internal psychological cues specifically relevant to the 
attitude, belief, or event of interest. Instead . . . the respondent 
may select an answer completely arbitrarily.”). 
131. See Robert Cooke, Life Out There? Majority Thinks So, 
NEWSDAYUSA (Dec. 16, 1997), available on Westlaw NewsRoom 
at 1997 WLNR 586871. 
132. Id. 
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affirmatively were then asked to compare the intelligence of space 
aliens and earthlings, forty-seven percent asserted that the extra-
terrestrials were more intelligent, thirteen percent thought they 
were less intelligent, and forty percent thought we were “about 
the same.”133 Can such “research findings” be taken as a serious 
guide to the existence and IQs of space aliens? 
Similarly, whether or not they are capable of knowing how 
much defensive medicine is practiced as a result of fear of 
lawsuits, physician respondents provide responses. Those 
responses can be put to work to create other “facts” and policy 
arguments. For example, Jackson Healthcare conducted its own 
survey of doctors and asked them to estimate the overall 
percentage of healthcare costs that were attributable to defensive 
medicine.134 The answer was a staggering thirty-four percent.135 
Jackson then hired the Gallup Organization to repeat the survey 
(with presumably better design, sampling, and questioning). The 
new answer was twenty-six percent.136 Multiplying those findings 
by the total cost of healthcare, which the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services at that time estimated to be $2.5 trillion,137 
yielded Jackson Healthcare’s assessment: “between $650 billion 
and $850 billion are being spent each year due to defensive, or 
lawsuit-driven, medicine.”138 
How seriously can the self-report survey approach be taken? 
OTA concluded after its extensive review of similar surveys that 
they had little value: “Survey-based estimates of the national cost 
of defensive medicine advanced by researchers at several 
organizations are unreliable and potentially biased.”139 Although 
simple surveys of complicated issues are notorious for providing 
little in the way of meaningful information, they are nevertheless 
frequently employed because they are relatively cheap and easy 
to do.140 This is not to say that direct physician surveys cannot 
 
133. Id. 





139. OTA-H-602, supra note 66, at 74. 
140. A comparison of the next two research approaches—clinical 
scenario surveys and multivariate statistical analyses—will make 
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be of value when they inquire about something that the 
respondents are in a good position to know something about and 
ways are found to obtain candid answers. But, on the topic of 
defensive medicine, it’s hard to see of what value such “data” 
would be apart from lobbying. 
B. Clinical Scenario Surveys 
An alternative approach is to present descriptions of specific 
cases to samples of physicians and asking them how they would 
handle the case: what tests, what treatments, and why. Responses 
to broad, general survey questions and more concrete, specific 
clinical scenarios can produce dramatically different results. For 
example, Stalans and Diamond found in their 1990 study that 
survey respondents generally stated that most criminal sentences 
are too short. But, when the researchers described specific crimes 
and asked what the proper sentence should, respondents on 
average recommend lower sentences than what the courts actually 
give.141 Thus, different research approaches to the same question 
can lead to very different conclusions. 
In the defensive medicine context, case scenarios have been 
designed to allow researchers to infer whether the clinical choices 
deviate from what is medically appropriate in ways that serve the 
interests of the doctor more than they benefit the patient.142 
Compared to the surveys described above, scenario studies are 
few and far between (for the same reasons that direct-ask surveys 
 
demonstrate the point. See also, Michael J. Saks, Scientific Method: 
The Logic of Drawing Inferences from Empirical Evidence, in 
MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT 
TESTIMONY § 4:6 (David L. Faigman et al., eds., 2018–19) 
[hereinafter Saks—Scientific Method] (“It is easier to ask someone 
how often they drive while intoxicated than it is to try to follow 
them around and directly observe the behavior. But, as the example 
makes apparent, the price of ease of inquiry may be decreased 
accuracy.”). 
141. Loretta J. Stalans & Shari S. Diamond, Formation and Change in 
Lay Evaluations of Criminal Sentencing: Misperception and 
Discontent, 14 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 199, 200 (1990). 
142. OTA-H-602, supra note 66, at 75. 
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are so numerous: cost and difficulty).143 Actual medical knowledge 
is needed to prepare the scenarios and to evaluate the responses.144 
Scenario surveys can be conducted without prompting or 
priming—that is, conveying in any way that “this study is about 
defensive medicine and how you feel about malpractice 
litigation,” thereby evoking respondents’ thoughts and feelings 
about those issues. But these surveys also reveal only what 
respondents say rather than what they do. Still, a major virtue of 
the scenarios is that they are so specific. Instead of a vague count 
of how many doctors feel they acted defensively, the doctor reacts 
to a specific description of a patient with specific health problems. 
Specificity is also a limitation of the scenario approach because 
the responses cannot easily be generalized to other patients and 
other conditions. To obtain a more complete picture of how much 
defensive medicine is (impliedly) practiced, a wide range of 
scenarios would have to be presented to many different doctors. 
The OTA’s conclusion from the scenario studies it reviewed and 
the new studies it conducted was: “Although it is possible to 
identify particular clinical situations in which defensive medicine 
plays a relatively major role, it is impossible in the final analysis 
to draw any conclusions about the overall extent or cost of 
defensive medicine.”145 
Most of the clinical scenario studies by OTA and others were 
chosen and “specifically designed to increase the likelihood of [a] 
defensive response by physicians.”146 Thus, they were not 
representative of most diagnostic situations that doctors would 
encounter. Even so, doctors responding to these scenarios 
employed defensive practices very little.147 Certain scenarios did, 
however, arouse more cautious responses than others. For 
 
143. See id. at 41–42. 
144. Direct-ask surveys pose a question like: “Have you increased 
defensive practices out of malpractice liability concerns?” while 
clinical scenarios involve designing cases with specific medical facts, 
diagnostic options, and treatment options–and knowing which are 
standard practice within the appropriate specialty and which 
reflect excessive caution. See generally Phil EM Smith & John C 
Mucklow, Writing Clinical Scenarios for Clinical Science 
Questions, 16 CLINICAL MED. 142, 142 (2016). 
145. OTA-H-602, supra note 66, at 74. 
146. Id. at 56. 
147. Id. 
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example, the survey presented a “15-year-old boy with a minor 
head injury resulting from a skateboard accident.”148 Nearly half 
of the respondents said that they would order a CT scan, and 
nearly half of those “said they would order it . . . primarily out 
of concern for malpractice.”149 
The contrast between the scenarios that did and did not elicit 
defensive practices can potentially help refine our understanding 
of when doctors act defensively, when they do not, and why. The 
case example above represents a situation where the risk of 
missing a serious diagnosis is small; but, if one is missed, then the 
outcome could be catastrophic.150 Under such circumstances, 
doctors are inclined to worry about error, harm to the patient, 
and malpractice liability, all of which lead to them ordering more 
testing than might be thought necessary. 
On the one hand, this appears to be defensive behavior 
prompted by fear of litigation because most CT scans carried out 
under such circumstances will find the brain was undamaged.151 
On the other hand, perhaps this is where an excess of caution 
(and additional expense) benefits the patient by ensuring that 
serious brain damage is not in the process of developing. Recall 
Dr. Gawande’s insistence, earlier in this article, that his son get 
the extra testing and observation in a very similar situation. 
In another study using clinical scenarios, researchers hunted 
for correlates of excessive resource use.152 They wondered if a 
relationship might exist between apparent defensive practices and 
the physicians’ history of defending malpractice claims.153 Might 
those who had been sued previously be more vigilant about 
avoiding future suits? The research found no evidence of such a 
 
148. Id. at 5. 
149. Id. 
150. Herbert H. Engelhard, Subdural Hematoma Surgery, MEDSCAPE 
(Aug. 10, 2018), https://emedicine.medscape.com/article/247472-
overview [https://perma.cc/Z37G-JUF5] (“The mortality of acute 
SDH has been reported to be in the range of 36–79%. Many 
survivors do not regain previous levels of functioning, especially 
after an acute SDH severe enough to necessitate surgical drainage. 
Favorable outcome rates after acute SDH range from 14% to 
40%.”). 
151. OTA-H-602, supra note 66, at 65. 
152. Id. at 69. 
153. Id. 
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relationship.154 The only variables found to be consistently 
correlated, across multiple scenarios, were doctors’ attitudes 
toward cost consciousness and their subjective estimates of the 
probability that they were dealing with a potentially severe health 
problem.155 The analysis was that those who were more concerned 
about costs tended to keep costs lower, while those who saw 
higher risks of severe harm to a patient tended to want to do 
more, as in the head injury cases.156 
Overall, “[i]n clinical scenario surveys designed specifically to 
elicit a defensive response, malpractice concerns were occasionally 
cited as an important factor in clinical decisions. However, 
physicians’ belief that a course of action is medically indicated 
was the most important determinant of physicians’ clinical 
choices.”157 The contrast between the conclusions reached based 
on direct-ask surveys versus those from clinical scenarios 
illustrates how powerful an impact research design can have on 
what a study finds. A wholly different methodological approach 
is to stop asking doctors what they say they have done or what 
they say they would do, and to try to look at what they actually 
do. 
C. Multivariate Statistical Analyses 
The third research approach consists of statistical analysis of 
existing databases pertaining to the volume of tests and 
procedures that doctors order in states with different levels of 
malpractice risk. Defensive practice typically is measured in 
dollars of excessive Medicare expenditures. Malpractice risk in 
these studies has been measured by malpractice premiums, 
incidence of lawsuits, or tort reforms. The basic idea is that where 
malpractice risk is lower, doctors will be less fearful, and will 
therefore practice less defensively, diagnose and treat less 
intensely, and consequently cause fewer healthcare dollars to be 





157. Id. at 74. 
158. For more on these concepts, see Katherine Baicker et al., 
Malpractice Liability Costs and the Practice of Medicine in the 
Medicare Program, 26 HEALTH AFF. 841, 844 (2007). 
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“All else being equal” is the Achilles’ heel of this approach. 
In contrast to an experiment in which two or more groups are 
created equal by random assignment to treatment conditions, but 
then treated differently so that the treatment’s effects can be 
compared on an apples-to-apples basis, two pre-existing groups 
are rarely if ever “equal.” For example, patients in a state with 
higher malpractice premiums might also have a population of 
Medicare recipients who are older or poorer or sicker than those 
in a state with less spending. Perhaps they face different health 
problems for other reasons. Or, other changes in the state have 
occurred—other legal reforms, for example—that confound 
malpractice risk with other influences on Medicare spending. 
Relying on healthcare spending to reflect the quantum of 
defensive medicine presents a more unusual problem. For 
example, treatment intensity varies as a function of the supply of 
healthcare services, not only patients’ health needs.159 Moreover, 
the blurry line between healthcare fraud and defensive medicine 
has methodological implications. Studies that have compared 
Medicare billings to patient records have found that the billings 
can overstate healthcare actually provided, sometimes by a 
considerable amount—a discrepancy of sixty to ninety percent, 
depending on a patient’s diagnose.160 According to healthcare-
fraud expert Malcolm Sparrow, researchers who equate Medicare 
billings with medical services actually provided are missing the 
distorting effect of fraud on their data.161 Thus, in places where 
Medicare fraud is higher, spending will be higher, and researchers 
can mistake that for defensive medicine being be greater. 
Let’s suppose that all of the confounding variables—patient 
health status, different provider practice patterns, demographic 
differences, state law differences, level of healthcare fraud, etc.—
could be controlled for on a state-by-state basis. If researchers 
then compared State A which passed a particular tort reform act 
against State B which lacks that reform, then the finding that 
providers in State A billed for fewer Medicare dollars than 
 
159. See, e.g., Elliott S. Fisher & John E. Wennberg, Health Care 
Quality, Geographic Variations, and the Challenge of Supply-
Sensitive Care, 46 PERSPS. IN BIOLOGY AND MED. 69, 73 (2003). 
160. Paul Jesilow, The Effects of Fraud on the Evaluation of Health 
Care, 13 HEALTH CARE ANALYSIS 239, 241 (2005). 
161. Joe Eaton, The War on Medicare Fraud, AARP BULL. (June 2016). 
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providers in State B would be consistent with the hypothesis that 
malpractice risk explains the difference. 
But those inferences can be drawn soundly only if researchers 
are able to disentangle the possible cause of interest from the 
potential confounding variables by making statistical adjustments 
using measures of those potentially confounding variables—the 
“multivariate” in multivariate statistical analysis.162 These 
adjustments are not simple and straightforward because the study 
might not have collected data on a critically important 
confounding variable, or the statistical model might contain the 
potential confounder but under-adjust for its impact. 
Inadequately controlled observational studies can result in 
dramatically erroneous conclusions, as medical researchers know 
all too well. For example, studies using such research designs led 
to the conclusion that estrogen replacement was beneficial to 
post-menopausal women.163 The methodological risk was that 
women who sought and obtained hormone replacement differed 
in various ways from those who did not—perhaps being 
essentially healthier, wealthier, and taking better care of 
themselves in various ways.164 Better health outcomes for those 
women might seem to be attributable to the estrogen when in 
reality they were attributable to those confounding factors.165 
Eventually, better-designed research methods, randomized 
controlled trials, discovered not only that hormone replacement 
was not producing better health outcomes, but also that it was 
dangerous for many women.166 Incorrect conclusions about 
estrogen based on findings from multivariate, observational 
(correlational) research designs led to tens of thousands of 
avoidable breast cancers, heart attacks, and strokes.167 
Despite its imperfections, the multivariate approach has the 
virtue of dealing with the behavior of actual doctors making real 
choices about treatment of real patients—not merely what 
 
162. See generally ALVIN C. RENCHER AND WILLIAM F. CHRISTENSEN, 
METHODS OF MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS (3d ed. 2012). 
163. JERRY AVORN, POWERFUL MEDICINES: THE BENEFITS, RISKS, AND 
COSTS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 28–9 (2004). 
164. Id.at 36–37. 
165. Id.at 37. 
166. Id.at 33–34. 
167. Id. at 38. 
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doctors in surveys say they have done or would do. Keeping 
reasonable cautions about confounds and file drawers and so on 
in mind, we review the multivariate studies. 
1. Studies and Their Findings: Cesarean Sections 
One popular line of such studies looked at cesarean sections. 
They did so because an obstetrician’s preference for delivering a 
baby vaginally or surgically was suspected of being especially 
sensitive to the malpractice risk climate.168 The assumption was 
that, where the risk of malpractice litigation was higher, 
obstetricians would perform an increased number of cesareans.169 
Taken together, the results of the studies are inconclusive. Some 
did find higher cesarean delivery rates where malpractice risk was 
greater.170 Other studies found little evidence that cesarean rates 
increased in response to higher malpractice risks or costs; or, they 
found decreases in the rate of cesareans.171 
 
168. Leonard J. Nelson III et al., Medical Liability and Health Care 
Reform, 21 HEALTH MATRIX: J. OF L. MED. 443, 482–83 (2011). 
169. Id. 
170. See Lisa Dubay et al., The Impact of Malpractice Fears on 
Cesarean Section Rates, 18 J. HEALTH ECON. 491, 519 (1999) 
(reviewing national birth data from 1990–92, and finding that 
where malpractice premiums were higher, cesarean rates were 
higher, primarily for patients in lower socioeconomic strata); A. 
Russell Localio et al., Relationship Between Malpractice Claims 
and Caesarean Delivery, 269 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 366 (1993) (using 
New York State hospital claims data for 1984); Karna Murthy et 
al., Association Between Rising Professional Liability Insurance 
Premiums and Primary Cesarean Delivery Rates, 10 OBSTETRICS 
& GYNECOLOGY 1264, 1265 (2007) (explaining that Illinois 
obstetricians’ higher rates of primary cesarean delivery were 
associated with higher medical-liability insurance premiums for 
Illinois obstetricians-gynecologists). 
171. See, e.g., Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, Medicare 
Spending, the Physician Workforce, and Beneficiaries’ Quality of 
Care, 23 HEALTH AFF. WEB EXCLUSIVES W4-184, w4-192 (2004); 
Janet Currie & W. Bentley MacLeod, First Do No Harm? Tort 
Reform and Birth Outcomes, 123 Q. J. ECON. 819, 826 (2008) 
(finding that replacing the traditional rule of joint and several 
liability with proportional-share liability for all defendants reduced 
complications of labor and cesarean deliveries, but that the 
introduction of noneconomic damages caps increased the rate of 
cesarean deliveries); David Dranove & Yasutora Watanabe, 
Influence and Deterrence: How Obstetricians Respond to Litigation 
against Themselves and Their Colleagues, 12 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 
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Interestingly, at least one research team found a relationship 
between cesareans and malpractice concerns, but wondered 
whether it reflected improved practice in response to higher 
malpractice risk.172 A climate of greater malpractice risk was 
associated with increased use of electronic fetal monitoring, more 
diagnoses of fetal distress, and more consequent use of cesarean 
deliveries.173 
2. Studies and Their Findings: Cardiac and Other Medical 
Procedures 
In examining other medical procedures, a convoluted picture 
emerges. Some studies have found evidence that wasteful 
spending ordered by doctors is at least somewhat correlated with 
the level of malpractice risk faced by those doctors. The earliest 
of these studies, one that sets the high-water mark for findings of 
a defensive-medicine effect, was conducted by Kessler and 
McClellan and published in 1996.174 They looked at the effects of 
state malpractice-law reforms on Medicare spending for hospital 
patients who were treated for acute myocardial infarction (AMI) 
or new ischemic heart disease (IHD) in 1984, 1987 and 1990.175 
They found that what they termed “direct” tort reforms (damages 
caps, abolition of punitive damages, elimination of mandatory 
pre-judgment interest, changes in the collateral source rule176) 
 
69, 92 (2010) (using micro-data, and finding a short-term, hospital-
wide increase in cesarean rates in response to malpractice suits 
against them or their colleagues, and an upsurge in the use of 
cesareans by the responsible physician, but that these effects 
disappeared in a short time); Frakes, supra note 105, at 473–77 
(finding that a noneconomic damage cap was associated with a 
reduction in the utilization of episiotomies during vaginal 
deliveries); Beomsoo Kim, The Impact of Malpractice Risk on the 
Use of Obstetrics Procedures, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. S79, S79 (2007) 
(finding that cesarean rates tend not to be sensitive to malpractice 
risk). 
172. A. Dale Tussing & Martha A. Wojtowycz, Malpractice, Defensive 
Medicine, and Obstetric Behavior, 35 MED. CARE 172, 178 (1997). 
173. Id. 
174. Daniel P. Kessler & Mark McClellan, Do Doctors Practice 
Defensive Medicine?, 111 Q. J. ECON. 353, 388 (1996) [hereinafter 
Kessler & McClellan—1996]. 
175. Id. at 354. 
176. These changes allow juries to learn whether the injured patient has 
other insurance sources to cover their losses. See 50 State Collateral 
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were associated with a 5% to 9% annual reduction in medical 
expenditures for patients with those two conditions.177 And those 
reductions occurred “without substantial effects on mortality” or 
greater need for readmission for AMI or IHD—suggesting that 
the additional care being delivered was of little benefit to patients 
and could safely be omitted.178 “Indirect” reforms combined 
(including such changes as limitations on plaintiff attorney 
contingency fees, mandatory periodic payments, joint and several 
liability and patient compensation funds) reduced Medicare 
payments by 1.8%.179 The elimination of joint and several liability 
and replacing it with a proportionate share liability rule resulted 
in a small increase in Medicare spending.180 If their results could 
be generalized to all health care costs, not just treatment of two 
heart conditions for Medicare inpatients, then defensive medicine 
could account for a substantial amount of wasteful healthcare 
spending. 
Later studies built on, expanded, and improved Kessler and 
McClellan’s initial work in various respects, among them: 
(1)including more illness conditions (as opposed to focusing on 
just two types of heart disease);181 (2) examining outpatient 
spending as well as inpatient spending;182 (3) analyzing physician 
spending as well as hospital spending;183 (4) studying private 
spending as well as Medicare spending;184 (5) covering longer time 
 
Source Overview, THE HARMONIE GROUP https://www.harmonie
.org/file/Litigation%20Best%20Practices/Collateral%20Source
%20Rule%202016.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UH6-BTE9] (last visited 
Nov. 22, 2019). 
177. Kessler & McClellan—1996, supra note 185, at 386. 
178. Id. at 382–83. 
179. Id. at 385. 
180. Id. at 372, 377. 
181. See, e.g., Baiker & Chandra, infra note 40, at 841; Sloan & Shadle, 
supra note 4; J. William Thomas et al., infra note 200, at 1581; 
Nelson III et al., supra note 168, at 477–79. 
182. See, e.g., Thomas et al., infra note 200, at 1579. 
183. ALI MOGHTADERI ET AL., DAMAGE CAPS AND DEFENSIVE MEDICINE: 
REEXAMINATION WITH PATIENT LEVEL DATA (Oct. 2017); 
Lakdawalla & Seabury, infra note 205, at 362–367. 
184. E.g., Letter to Senator Hatch, infra note 195, at 4–5. 
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periods;185 (6) using larger samples;186 and (7) trying to control for 
additional confounding variables.187 
One of the later studies was a follow-up by Kessler and 
McClellan themselves. They looked at the population of Medicare 
beneficiaries with heart disease in 1984 through 1994.188 They 
found that noneconomic-damage caps were associated with a 
4.2% decrease in spending for AMI patients and a 4.4% decrease 
in spending for IHD patients189 (contrasting with 5.8% and 8.9%, 
respectively, from the initial study).190 Moreover, the follow-up 
found that managed care stanched the excess spending as well as 
tort reform did.191 
A 2003 study by researchers at the Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) studied Medicare patients treated for a broad range 
of conditions, but “failed to find any impact of state tort laws on 
medical spending.”192 A 2006 CBO study, looking at a broader set 
of spending measures from 1980 through 2003 (and employing 
more statistical controls), found that caps on noneconomic 
damages resulted in no reduction in overall health care spending, 
but did reduce Medicare inpatient spending.193 The study also 
found that the replacement of joint and several liability with 
proportionate share allocation of liability resulted in a 4% 
increase in overall Medicare spending.194 The CBO’s conclusion 
 
185. Daniel P. Kessler & Mark McClellan, Malpractice Law and Health 
Care Reform: Optimal Liability Policy in an Era of Managed Care, 
84 J. PUB. ECON. 175, 184 (2002) [hereinafter Kessler & 
McClellan—2002]; Letter to Senator Hatch, infra note 195, at 5; 
See, e.g., Thomas et al., infra note 200, at 1579. 
186. See, e.g., Letter to Senator Hatch, infra note 195. 
187. Kessler & McClellan—2002, supra note 185, at 182; See, e.g., 
Thomas et al., infra note 200, at 1580. 
188. Kessler & McClellan—2002, supra note 185, at 175. 
189. Id. at 189. 
190. Kessler & McClellan—1996, supra note 174, at 382. 
191. Kessler & McClellan—2002, supra note 185, at 194. 
192. CONG. BUDGET OFF., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF., GAO-03-836, 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: IMPLICATIONS OF RISING PREMIUMS ON 
ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE, at 29 (2003). 
193. CONG. BUDGET OFF., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE TORT LIMITS AND 
HEALTH CARE SPENDING, at 34 (2006). 
194. Id. at 23. This finding should not be too surprising. Under the 
traditional rule, hospital liability insurers often covered the costs 
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was that the evidence was weak or inconclusive that tort reform 
could reduce defensive medicine.195 
Similarly, Baicker and Chandra found little evidence of 
changes in treatment patterns for several different treatment 
protocols for Medicare enrollees or overall expenses in Medicare 
programs associated with increases in liability insurance 
premiums.196 The following year, Baicker and other colleagues 
found that “higher malpractice awards and premiums are 
associated with higher Medicare spending, especially for imaging 
services,” but those increases represented less than 0.6% of 
aggregate spending.197 
Sloan and Shadle extended Kessler and McClellan’s approach 
by looking at Medicare payments over a longer time period (1985–
2000), expanding the range of health conditions beyond heart 
disease, collecting data on treatment settings that included 
outpatients as well as inpatients, and implementing additional 
controls (notably the health status of the patient).198 They found 
no statistically significant reduction in healthcare payments, 
 
of all defendants, or all damages were assessed against the physician 
defendant who was judged to be principally responsible for the 
harm. Under the reform, however, plaintiffs are compelled to name 
more defendants and to seek judgments against all of them in order 
to recover the full amount of damages that the court found the 
injured patient to be entitled to. Any defensive strategies that were 
being undertaken would, if anything, increase. Id. 
195. Id. at 35. Later, the director of OMB, Douglas W. Elmendorf, 
responded to a query in a Letter to Senator Orrin G. Hatch 
(Congressional Budget Office, Oct. 9, 2009, archived at 
http://perma.cc/P7KS-SQE8 [hereinafter Letter to Senator 
Hatch]), explaining that their data suggested that a package of tort 
reforms including a $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages; 
$500,000 cap on punitive damages; modification of the collateral 
source rule; shortening of the statute of limitations; and 
replacement of joint and several liability with a proportionate share 
allocation rule–would reduce total national health care spending 
attributable to utilization of services (by inference, attributable to 
defensive medicine) by about 0.3%–equal at that time to about $5.4 
billion per year. See id. 
196. Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, The Effect of Malpractice 
Liability on the Delivery of Health Care, 8 FORUM FOR HEALTH 
ECON. & POL’Y: FRONTIERS IN HEALTH POL’Y RES. 4, 18 (2006). 
197. Katherine Baicker et al., supra note 158, at 841. 
198. Sloan & Shadle, supra note 4, at 484. 
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concluding that Kessler and McClellan’s findings “do not 
generalize to other reasons for hospital admission,” and that “it 
seems inappropriate to conclude that tort reforms implemented 
to date succeed in reducing non-beneficial care.”199 
Thomas et al. studied 35 clinical specialties to assess whether 
and how much malpractice liability reforms would reduce 
healthcare spending. They concluded that “defensive medicine 
practices exist and are widespread, but their impact on medical 
care costs is small.”200 Further, they established that, across all 
35 specialties, “if medical malpractice premiums were to be 
reduced as much as 30 percent, defensive medicine costs would 
decline no more than 0.4 percent.”201 Nelson III et al. conducted 
a study focusing almost exclusively on the impact of damage caps 
and concluded that “it is not clear that . . . damages caps will 
significantly reduce health care costs or that any savings will be 
passed on to consumers.”202 Ronen Avraham and colleagues found 
a three-to-five-percent reduction in intensive cardiac 
interventions following adoption of familiar tort reforms 
(including damages caps), and estimated a total reduction of 
about 1–2% across the entire healthcare system.203 Like Kessler 
and McClellan found in 2002, Avraham and colleagues found that 
managed care could eliminate the excess spending caused by 
defensive practices.204 
Lakdawalla and Seabury used jury awards in malpractice 
cases as the measure of litigation pressure and found that where 
trial awards were higher medical expenditures were higher, 
presumably from defensive practices.205 The difficulty with such 
an approach is that jury awards tend to rise as tort reforms make 
the bringing of a claim costlier and riskier for plaintiffs’ 
 
199. Id. at 490. 
200. J. William Thomas et al., Low Costs of Defensive Medicine, Small 
Savings from Tort Reform, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1578, 1582–83 (2010). 
201. Id. at 1583–84. 
202. Nelson III et al., supra note 168, at 448. 
203. Ronen Avraham et al., The Impact of Tort Reform on Employer-
Sponsored Health Insurance Premiums, 28 J. OF L., ECON. & ORG. 
657, 661, 674, 684 (2012). 
204. Id. at 658, 676. 
205. Darius N. Lakdawalla & Seth A. Seabury, The Welfare Effects of 
Malpractice Liability, 32 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 356, 365 (2012). 
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attorneys.206 Consequently, in a world of tort reform, rising jury 
awards might, paradoxically, indicate a litigation environment 
that is becoming more—not less—favorable to defendants. 
Paik and colleagues studied how Medicare spending changed 
after Texas adopted comprehensive tort reform in 2003, including 
a strict damages cap, by comparing spending in Texas counties 
with high claim rates to spending in counties with low claim 
rates.207 The study found no decline in spending in the high-
litigation-risk counties compared to the low-risk counties.208 
Compared to national spending trends, if anything, spending in 
Texas increased post-reform. “In sum,” the study concluded, “we 
find no evidence that Texas’s tort reforms bent the cost curve 
downward.”209 
In an expanded study, Paik and colleagues re-analyzed the 
effects of tort reforms, particularly damages caps, of the mid-
1980s and found no change in Medicare spending as a 
consequence.210 They also analyzed the effects of the imposition 
of caps in nine states during the “third wave” of tort reforms 
(2002–2005). They found no significant impact on Medicare Part 
A (hospital) spending, but did find an approximately 4% increase 
in Medicare Part B (physician services) spending (rather than the 
predicted reduction in spending when liability fears are 
reduced).211 Another study, by Moghtaderi et al., found little to 
no association between the existence of caps and Part A and B 
Medicare spending nor between caps and a range of cardiac 
testing rates and interventions.212 
 
206. Plaintiffs’ attorneys screen out cases involving weaker evidence and 
smaller expected settlement or award amounts. See generally 
Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior 
of the Tort Litigation System – And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 
1147 (1992). 
207. Myungho Paik et al., Will Tort Reform Bend the Cost Curve? 
Evidence from Texas, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 173, 173 (2012). 
208. Id. 
209. Id. 
210. Myungho Paik et al., Damage Caps and Defensive Medicine, 
Revisited, 51 J. HEALTH ECON. 84, 84 (2017) [hereinafter Paik et 
al.—Damage Caps]. 
211. Id. 
212. MOGHTADERI ET AL., supra note 183. 
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Most worrisome, of course, is the possibility that reducing or 
removing the risk of tort liability reduces safety for patients. Of 
the studies that tested for that outcome, most found no effect, 
but a few reached findings that could raise concerns. Reviewing 
research that examined mortality as a function of tort law reforms 
in 2009, the CBO found evidence that malpractice law reforms 
led to a small increase in the nation’s overall death and injury 
rate—translating, at the time, to approximately 5,000 additional 
deaths and 400,000 more injuries.213 Similarly, Lakdawalla and 
Seabury found that defensive practices were beneficial to patients 
and therefore that tort reforms aimed at reducing physician 
liability expenses were not cost-effective.214 Currie and McLeod 
found that the introduction of noneconomic damages caps 
actually increased the rate of cesareans—one intuitively expects 
them to decrease—as well as increased preventable complications 
of labor.215 More recently, Zabinski and Black found that imposing 
caps on general damage awards triggered gradually rising rates of 
harmful errors, which are measured using the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality’s (AHRQ) Patient Safety 
Indicators instrument.216 
 
213. Letter to Senator Hatch, supra note 195. 
214. Lakdawalla & Seabury, supra note 205, at 368. 
215. Currie & Bentley MacLeod, supra note 171, at 826. 
216. Zenon Zabinski & Bernard S. Black, The Deterrent Effect of Tort 
Law: Evidence from Medical Malpractice Reform, RESEARCH 
PAPER NO. 13-09, NW. UNIV. L. & ECON. (Feb. 15, 2015), available 
at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2161362 [https://perma.cc/
UZ3T-W7PU]. The study looked at the effect on patient safety of 
adopting caps (limiting general damage awards) in five states 
(Florida, Georgia, Illinois, South Carolina, and Texas), which were 
also compared to control states that did not adopt the caps reform, 
thereby allowing trends due to other factors to be taken into 
consideration. As a measure of safety practices, the researchers used 
the PSI (Patient Safety Indicators instrument), developed by the 
AHRQ. The research found that in states with caps on damages, 
the level of safety as measured by the PSI declined. “We find a 
gradual rise in rates [of errors and harm] for most PSIs after reform, 
consistent with a gradual relaxation of care, or failure to reinforce 
care standards over time. The decline is widespread and applies 
both to aspects of care that are relatively likely to lead to a 
malpractice suit (e.g., PSI-5; foreign body left in during surgery), 
and aspects that are unlikely to do so (e.g., PSI-7; central-line 
associated bloodstream infection). The broad relaxation of care 
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In all, the multivariate studies present quite a mixed picture, 
even in regard to the fundamental question of whether defensive 
medicine exists. And, if it does, in regard to what health 
conditions, to what extent, and at what cost it exists. The best-
informed conclusion would have to be: more research is needed to 
establish sound answers to these questions.217 
3. One “Almost Quasi-Experiment” 
Frakes and Gruber recently reported an important study that 
improves upon the multivariate approach, approximating some of 
the qualities of a randomized experiment.218 They designed their 
study around an idiosyncrasy of the U.S. military health services 
(MHS) in its prohibition on suing for medical negligence.219 Under 
the Feres doctrine, active-duty personnel who believe that they 
have been injured through negligent care have no right to sue for 
compensation.220 This is in stark contrast to other patients at 
military hospitals—dependents, retirees, and other family 
members—whose malpractice claims face no such bar. 
In essence, from one patient to the next, the very same 
military treatment facilities (MTFs) and their staff face two 
different worlds: one with and one without the possibility of 
malpractice liability. It’s almost a true experiment. But because 
patients in the two groups differ in ways that likely confound 
observed differences, and because other mechanisms might be 
responsible for observed differences, the researchers also used 
multivariate analyses to try to statistically remove possible 
 
suggests that medical malpractice liability provides ‘general 
deterrence’—an incentive to be careful in general . . . .” Id. 
217. See also Michael Frakes & Jonathan Gruber, Defensive Medicine: 
Evidence from Military Immunity, 11 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 
197 (2019) (summing up the same body of multivariate studies by 
saying that, “[c]ollectively, the . . . findings paint a varied picture 
of both the size and existence of defensive medicine.”). 
218. Id. For a design that many researchers would characterize as a 
quasi-experiment, see Saks—Scientific Method, supra note 140, at 
§ 4:43. 
219. See generally Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 159 (1950) 
(concluding that the United States “is not liable under the Federal 
Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise 
out of or are in the course of activity incident to service.”). 
220. Id. 
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confounding.221 Still, their approach comes closer than any other 
to being an apples-to-apples comparison. If providers at MTFs 
order more tests for their patients who possess the right to sue 
than they do for patients who have no right to sue, all else equal, 
then those differences likely result from defensive practices rather 
than something else. In addition, another basis for comparison 
arose when some military base hospitals closed and military 
patients had to turn to non-military hospitals for care.222 
Here, we summarize Frakes and Gruber’s main findings. On 
several different measures of treatment intensity, patients at on-
base MTFs who could not sue received four-to-five percent less 
care than those who could sue.223 Where doctors had less 
discretion whether to treat or not, that effect of liability immunity 
was reduced by one-to-two percent.224 In regard to patients for 
whom doctors were not immune from suit, the higher intensity of 
care was far more likely to consist of diagnostic procedures rather 
than non-diagnostic procedures.225 All but two non-diagnostic 
procedures showed no differences in frequency in the care of 
patients who were, versus who were not, able to sue.226 Those 
two—gastrointestinal and orthopedic admissions (which were 
only marginally statistically significant)—suggested that 
providers were less likely to order those procedures for patients 
who had the power to sue.227 Interestingly, all else equal, MTFs 
treated patients at a lower intensity than private hospitals did.228 
Frakes and Gruber’s study also permits an estimate of the 
maximum savings that might be realized if the healthcare 
industry were made completely immune from tort liability, which 
we discuss in the concluding section. 
 
221. See Frakes & Gruber, supra note 217, at 229. 
222. Id. at 209–10. 
223. Id. at 204, 220. 
224. Id. at 220. 
225. Id. at 221. 
226. Id. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. at 216. Perhaps this reflects the “restraining hand” of managed 
care. 
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Discussion 
The notion of defensive medicine presents a series of 
paradoxes. The most aggressive advocates on behalf of the 
healthcare industry insist that healthcare workers routinely 
behave unethically, by lying to patients and insurers; recklessly, 
by subjecting patients to needless tests and treatments; 
wastefully and fraudulently, by redistributing wealth from 
patients, insurers, and taxpayers to themselves by ordering 
inappropriate procedures. They insist, however, that potential 
remedies should not be focused on the actors who engage in such 
behavior because their actions are motivated by fear—a fear of 
being compelled by the law to reimburse patients for losses 
resulting from preventable iatrogenic harms. Instead, healthcare 
advocates argue that the solution is to remove the source of the 
fear by further insulating the healthcare industry from legal 
accountability. Doing so, they promise, will make the evils of 
defensive medicine and the wasteful spending that results from it 
disappear. 
By contrast, those who would continue to apply conventional 
accident law to the healthcare industry do not seem to believe 
that healthcare providers behave as badly as the industry claims. 
Paradoxically, the industry’s argument implies a legal system 
that has a powerful influence on behavior. By the lights of the 
defensive medicine concept, physicians and other providers are 
being over-deterred by the tort system. Their solution is to 
insulate the healthcare industry from accident law. One might 
think, instead, that with helpful data and thoughtful 
adjustments, a legal tool so able to move behavior should be able 
to be employed to steer providers to deliver better and safer 
healthcare. Doing so could render litigation less necessary, reduce 
provider fears, make defensive practices unnecessary, and send 
wasteful healthcare expenditures downward. 
Another paradox arises from the fact that, if providers are 
caught ordering unnecessary tests, treatments, and other 
procedures, thereby fraudulently increasing their incomes, they 
are charged with healthcare fraud and are required to return their 
ill-gotten gain; they might also be confronted with civil penalties, 
if not criminal charges.229 But if they engage in essentially the 
same behavior under the flag of “defensive medicine,” then the 
 
229. See, e.g., GAO-12-820, supra note 78. 
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typical response is sympathetic concern for the fearful physician. 
In both scenarios, healthcare providers elevated their own 
interests above those of their patients and profited from doing so. 
But what at one moment evokes scorn for fraud and self-dealing 
is transformed in the blink of an eye into a cry for help. 
One of the most remarkable facts about defensive medicine is 
how successful the promotors of the notion have been in 
persuading legislators and the public of its existence, its 
seriousness, that it is key to solving the problem of exorbitant 
healthcare costs,230 and that the only cure for it worth discussing 
is to reduce the healthcare industry’s accountability. That, 
despite empirical evidence for the hypothesis which has been 
found contradictory and uncertain. Indeed, Paik and colleagues 
concluded that, although a “core policy argument used to support 
adoption of damage caps . . . is that caps will reduce defensive 
medicine and thus reduce healthcare spending,” their research 
found that caps led to higher spending.231 
Proponents of the defensive medicine hypothesis have put 
forward fantastic numbers, the most extreme of them 
approaching a trillion dollars annually, on air-thin bases. Even 
serious and sober studies have found their way to numbers at the 
high end of where the empirical evidence can take us. In their 
effort to calculate the total national cost of the medical liability 
system in the United States—from administrative costs to 
damages payments and everything in between—Mello et al. 
arrived at a figure of $45.6 billion (in 2008 dollars) for defensive 
medical practices ($38.8 billion by hospitals and $6.8 billion by 
physicians) and $10 billion for all other malpractice litigation 
system costs added together.232 Obviously, that is vastly less than 
 
230. President Barack Obama seems to have been at least somewhat 
persuaded: “I don’t believe malpractice reform is a silver bullet, but 
I have talked to enough doctors to know that defensive medicine 
may be contributing to unnecessary costs.” Barack Obama, 
President of the United States, Speech to a Joint Session of 




231. Paik et al.—Damage Caps, supra note 210, at 96. 
232. Michelle M. Mello et al., National Costs of the Medical Liability 
System, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1569 (2010) [hereinafter Mello et al.—
Costs]. 
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the survey-based guestimates of $650 to $850 billion (as much as 
$933 billion in today’s dollars233). But Mello et al. built their 
estimate of the defensive medicine components on Kessler and 
McClellan’s high-water-mark finding.234 Had Mello et al. averaged 
in the other studies, some of which found more modest fear-of-
litigation effects and others none at all, their estimate of costs 
attributable to defensive medicine would have been lower still.235 
Mello et al. do note that the quality of the sources for their 
estimate of defensive medicine costs was unavoidably one of the 
weakest of all cost components in their study, and classify the 
quality of that evidence as “low.”236 Indeed, the shaky quality of 
the underlying evidence might be the most important lesson to 
take from our entire exploration of the hypothesis of defensive 
medicine. 
So much for costs. What about benefits? Mello and colleagues 
recognized that from the cost of defensive practices one has to 
subtract the benefits secured by malpractice litigation. The most 
notable of these would be savings from injuries and deaths 
prevented. If that benefit exceeds the cost of defensive medicine, 
then the system provides a net gain to society. On this vital 
matter, Mello et al. write: “It is important to note, however, that 
our calculations ignored benefits arising from this spending.”237 
This is because the benefit figure is a known unknown. From a 
dollars-and-cents perspective, it does policy-makers little good to 
know the costs of any system or policy unless the benefits that 
those costs purchase for society are also known. And so, another 
curiosity of this debate has been its obsession with costs 
accompanied by a disregard of benefits.238 
 
233. Inflation Calculator, CPO INFLATION CALCULATOR, http://www.
in2013dollars.com [http://perma.cc/ 3BPB-T85S] (last visited Feb. 
21, 2020). 
234. Michael D. Frakes, The Surprising Relevance of Medical 
Malpractice Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 358 n. 79 (2015) (“Mello 
and her coauthors relied heavily on Kessler and McClellan, whose 
findings generally fall on the very high end of those studies that 
have found a positive association between liability forces and 
health-care costs.”). 
235. Id. 
236. Mello et al.—Costs, supra note 232, at 1574. 
237. Mello et al.—Costs, supra note 232. 
238. One recent study that offers a peek at the benefit side of the 
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Perhaps the chief concern of policy-makers is how to bring 
down America’s astonishingly high healthcare costs. To the 
extent that defensive medicine exists, how much can reducing or 
eliminating it contribute to bending the cost curve downward? 
Looking across the landscape of policy options for bringing 
healthcare costs under control, while ensuring broad access to 
care and promoting innovation, Mongan et al. in the New 
England Journal of Medicine, rated malpractice reforms as having 
the “lowest potential for cost savings” because the “direct costs 
of malpractice premiums” combined with the “estimated costs of 
‘defensive medicine’ are not major factors in overall health care 
spending.”239 More recently, Frakes summed up the research 
community’s consensus as being “that medical malpractice reform 
is unlikely to be a meaningful source of health-care cost 
containment.”240 
Frakes and Gruber have provided the approximate upper 
bound of savings that might accrue from reduced defensive 
practices if malpractice liability were abolished entirely, that 
amount being under five percent.241 The costs that would be 
 
adoption of caps, the most popular reform, seems to initiate a 
decline in patient safety measured by AHRQ’s PSI (Patient Safety 
Indicators)). 
239. James J. Mongan et al., Options for Slowing the Growth of Health 
Care Costs, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1509, 1512 (2008). 
240. Frakes, supra note 105, at 317; See Thomas et al., supra note 200, 
at 1583 (concluding that “defensive medicine practices exist and 
are widespread, but their impact on medical care costs is small.”); 
Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical 
Errors: Theory and Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. 
REV. 1595, 1629 (2002) (commenting that defensive medicine “has 
long been invoked by chronic defendants . . . as a rationale for 
enacting tort reform. However, the over deterrence rhetoric has not 
been firmly grounded in fact. Most defensive-medicine studies have 
failed to demonstrate any real impacts on medical practice arising 
from higher malpractice premiums.”). 
241. Margot Sanger-Katz, A Fear of Lawsuits Really Does Seem to 
Result in Extra Medical Tests, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/23/upshot/malpractice-
lawsuits-medical-costs.html [https://perma.cc/Z9RN-3SUQ] (“Mr. 
Gruber said the paper’s estimates were best viewed as a kind of 
ceiling for the effects of more realistic reforms . . . Any law that 
limits the cases where patients can sue, or the amount of money 
they can collect, is likely to lower medical use in the hospital by 
less than the 5 percent they measured in their study.”). 
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associated with abolition, including a rising incidence of 
iatrogenic injury, are unspecified. Thus, whether abolition would 
lead to net savings or net increased costs is unknown. 
If excessive healthcare costs are the principal concern (as it 
appears to be even among proponents of tort reform in the name 
of reducing defensive medicine), then we might expect the 
conversation to be about larger sources of wasteful expenditures 
in healthcare. Using Mello et al.’s estimate of the cost of defensive 
medicine, the portion of total healthcare spending attributable to 
defensive practices, is one-and-a-half percent.242 But that 
represents only a fraction of the approximately 20–30 percent of 
total healthcare expenditures that are squandered on low-value 
and no-value services.243 If the major concern is reducing 
healthcare costs by reducing wasteful spending, then attention 
might more fruitfully be given to the problems that account for 
more than ninety percent of the waste, and less on what accounts 
for only five-to-seven percent of the waste. The laser-beam focus 
on defensive medical practices suggests that the industry’s true 
interests are not in bending the cost curve. 
If defensive medicine is itself a particular concern, whatever 
the reasons, then attention could be given to reducing it more 
effectively: 
[i]f tort reformers were genuinely worried about defensive 
medicine and desired to prevent it, they would offer vastly 
different proposals from the ones they now endorse. 
Concern about unnecessary tests and procedures, for 
example, might lead them to call for evidence-based 
 
242. See Mello et al.—Costs, supra note 232, at 1574. Mello et al.’s 2008 
total of $45.6 billion of defensive medicine converts to $51.9 billion 
in 2017 dollars. Dividing that by total national spending on 
healthcare in 2017 ($3.5 trillion) yields a 1.5% increase. 
243. See JONATHAN SKINNER & ELLIOTT S. FISHER, DARTMOUTH INST. 
FOR HEALTH POL’Y & CLINICAL PRAC. REFLECTIONS ON 
GEOGRAPHIC VARIATIONS IN U.S. HEALTH CARE, at iii (Mar 31, 
2010), available at https://www.dartmouthatlas.org/downloads/
press/Skinner_Fisher_DA_05_10.pdf [http://perma.cc/8CZK-
MV2B] (finding that, if all regions of the U.S. could safely reduce 
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quality, healthcare cost savings of twenty to thirty percent could 
be achieved, but concluding that that is an underestimate because 
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treatment guidelines specifying when and if certain tests 
need to be performed.244 
As research described above has suggested, managed care can 
be as effective as tort reform in reducing defensive practices. 
Insurers could identify worthless practices and refuse to pay for 
them. Prosecutors could expand enforcement of healthcare fraud 
to include the most common defensive practices. Accountable 
care organizations (which are on the rise), or other forms of value-
based payment arrangements might, by their very nature, drive 
down defensive practices along with other low-value care.245 
One of the most illuminating findings is that tort reforms 
have little impact on the perceptions of healthcare providers 
about the legal environment that they inhabit. If providers are 
insensitive to the specific tort rules under which they practice, if 
they do not know what the law is in their jurisdiction, then they 
cannot sensibly adjust their estimation of malpractice risk. 
Instead, they simply have and hold onto a generalized fear of 
becoming a defendant in litigation. To the extent that describes 
providers’ state of knowledge, it means that the economic and 
psychological signals that are sent by any one (or package) of tort 
reforms tends to be overwhelmed by noise. 
That is what Carrier and her colleagues found: levels of 
malpractice concern that were generally high and unrelated to the 
actual level of lawsuit risk in the state where physicians 
practiced.246 Similarly, Hyman and Sage observe that 
“[p]hysicians in states with strong tort reforms and in states 
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246. Emily R. Carrier et al., Physicians’ Fears of Malpractice Lawsuits 
are not Assuaged by Tort Reforms, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1585, 1589 
(2010) (“We found high levels of malpractice concern among both 
generalists and specialists in states where objective measures of 
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common tort reforms.”). 
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lacking those reforms articulated identical views regarding 
malpractice risk.”247 Thus, according to Carrier et al., it is possible 
that “many policies aimed at controlling malpractice costs may 
have a limited effect on physicians’ malpractice concerns”—and 
therefore on practice behavior and costs.248 
Relatedly, Hyman and Sage have discussed the “habits and 
beliefs” of physicians, which “seem unaffected by evidence 
regarding the actual likelihood of a lawsuit or the level of 
potential damages.”249 This is consistent with findings of 
physicians’ overestimation of lawsuit risk250 and general “anxiety 
about medical malpractice litigation and liability,” which has 
been described as “pervasive . . . erroneous . . . and 
irrational . . . .”251 The insensitivity of healthcare providers to 
actual levels of litigation risk has led Scherz and Oliver to suggest 
that “[t]he only way to eliminate defensive medicine is to make it 
impossible for doctors to be sued for medical errors.”252 
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Another scenario aligns well with existing empirical evidence, 
and is consistent with an image of healthcare providers as 
thoughtful professionals who are properly concerned about their 
patients’ well-being, rather than routinely sacrificing their 
patients’ interests for their own.253 This scenario is that sick 
patients fall along a continuum ranging from clearly suffering 
from a condition that requires a particular treatment strategy, at 
one extreme, to clearly not suffering from the condition at the 
other extreme. For those clear cases, no defensive practices need 
be employed. Cases near the middle, characterized by the greatest 
uncertainty and high risk of error, will be more likely to prompt 
“defensive” behavior, especially for a condition where an 
erroneous diagnosis could lead to a disastrous outcome. Under 
such circumstances, non-cost-beneficially-optimal, “wasteful,” 
diagnostic testing is most likely to be undertaken.254 Whether that 
is done to protect the physician or the patient might be impossible 
to disentangle. Doctors might say that they thought they were 
acting defensively. But they were simultaneously making sure 
that the patient was being protected against the consequences of 
error. Under such circumstances, the line that divides defensive 
medicine from good medical practice becomes impossible to 
discern. 
An example of that kind of situation would be a head injury. 
If the patient suffered a potentially dangerous head injury that 
could have been detected with more testing and observation, but 
is not caught, the result for the patient could be devastating. 
That’s what the doctors responding to OTA’s head-injury-case 
scenario were almost certainly thinking about when they 
proposed to order “excessive” testing. That is certainly what Atul 
Gawande was worrying about when his son was taken to the ER 
after a fall. Furthermore, it is consistent with research finding 
that “the strongest effect of greater malpractice pressure is in 
increased use of imaging services, with somewhat smaller effects 
on the use of other discretionary, generally low-risk services such 
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as physician visits and consultations, use of diagnostic tests, and 
minor procedures.”255 
If that is what most “defensive medicine” looks like, then it 
is not irrational, not particularly wasteful, and not something 
many patients would wish to put a stop to. Perhaps most, if not 
all, defensive medicine stands at the confluence of two streams—
defensive practice and good medical practice—flowing together 
and becoming one, indistinguishable. 
Moreover, if that is the most accurate picture of defensive 
medical practice, then the basis for most of the malpractice law 
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